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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
Competitiveness partnerships consist of structured dialogue between the public and private sector to improve 
the investment climate. Competitiveness partnerships come in a wide range of forms, from broad-based 
statutory consultation involving business associations and labor unions to small and informal groups of 
prominent businessmen meeting with top government ministers. The political and economic context of a country 
determines the kind of partnership that is feasible and likely to succeed, but it is possible to distill some ideas 
and techniques from best practice. This paper aims to do that by drawing on the experiences of 40 countries.
2 It 
is designed to be used as a resource by donors, governments or businesspeople who are interested in 
establishing, maintaining or improving a competitiveness partnership in their country or region.  
 
This paper follows up on a case study published in 2004 by Herzberg on the Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
3 By encouraging ordinary businesspeople to submit ideas for regulatory reform, the Bulldozer 
sought to overcome the problem of the “constituency gap”, which arises when donors and governments design 
reforms without sufficient input from the core constituency of stakeholders who will ultimately be affected by 
them. It was widely accepted that these efforts to bridge the constituency gap in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
resulted in reforms which were better conceived and more effectively implemented because they arose from 
increased mutual understanding between government and the business community. 
 
In this paper, the authors investigate the experience of other countries with competitiveness partnerships and 
seek to identify common and replicable strategies and success factors. Because experience with structured 
public-private dialogue is relatively limited and the available literature even more so, this paper should not be 
seen as an attempt to provide definitive answers. Rather, it presents a variety of ideas and opinions on which 
practitioners can draw when considering their own particular circumstances. 
 
In addition to research of the published material listed in the bibliography, this paper draws on: 
•  cases and experiences involving the World Bank and the IFC and related documents; 
•  answers to a questionnaire to practitioners and further personal correspondence; 
•  personal experience of the authors with specific initiatives. 
The views presented in this article hence do not represent the official opinion of the World Bank Group.  
 
The paper has three parts. Part One outlines what competitiveness partnerships can achieve. Part Two 
describes how competitiveness partnerships function, presenting issues to consider when designing such 
partnerships and a range of ways in which they may be approached. Part Three identifies challenges that 
competitiveness partnerships have frequently faced and strategies that have been employed to overcome them. 
In the Annexes, the authors distill the most important questions raised in the paper into a concise checklist for 
practitioners (Annex I), identify useful online resources for further reading (Annex II), provide one-paragraph 
summaries of the competitiveness partnerships discussed in the paper (Annex III) and present the questionnaire 
sent to participants from which some examples in the paper are drawn (Annex IV).
                                                 
2 Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, Cook Islands, Czech Republic, D. R. Congo, East 
Timor, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kosovo, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Poland, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Zimbabwe. 
3 Investment Climate Reform Going the Last Mile: The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Benjamin Herzberg, World Bank, 
September 2004 Page 3 of 55 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction and Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................2 
Part One: The Payoffs of Partnership................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.1 – Policy Reforms........................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 
1.2 – Policy Implementation................................................................................................................................................................................ 5 
1.3 – Macro Impact ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.4 – Good governance...................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 
        1.4.1 – Setting an example......................................................................................................................................................................... 7 
        1.4.2 – Shedding light on institutions ......................................................................................................................................................... 7 
        1.4.3 – Improving private sector input into policy design........................................................................................................................... 7 
1.5 – Trust, understanding and social cohesion ................................................................................................................................................ 8 
Part Two: Options & Advice................................................................................................................................................................................. 10 
2.1 – Ignition...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 
        2.1.1 – Political will matters more than legal status................................................................................................................................. 10 
        2.1.2 – Creating and adapting institutions................................................................................................................................................ 10 
        2.1.3 – Establishing credibility.................................................................................................................................................................. 11 
        2.1.4 – Urgency, crisis and imaginary deadlines ..................................................................................................................................... 12 
        2.1.4 – Four Dimensions........................................................................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2 – Organizing participation........................................................................................................................................................................... 13 
        2.2.1 – Size of group................................................................................................................................................................................. 13 
        2.2.2 – Selection of participants ............................................................................................................................................................... 14 
        2.2.3 – Top-level government involvement.............................................................................................................................................. 14 
        2.2.4 – Unions, academics and NGOs..................................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3 – Structure................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 
        2.3.1 – Looseness vs. rigidity................................................................................................................................................................... 16 
        2.3.2 – Secretariat and working groups ................................................................................................................................................... 16 
        2.3.3 – The rhythm of meetings................................................................................................................................................................ 17 
        2.3.4 – Logistical details ........................................................................................................................................................................... 20 
        2.3.5 – Mapping the partnership’s structure to the government’s........................................................................................................... 20 
        2.3.6 – Local and Regional Groups.......................................................................................................................................................... 20 
2.4 – Setting and reaching goals...................................................................................................................................................................... 21 
        2.4.1 – Policy reforms............................................................................................................................................................................... 21 
        2.4.2 – Clear and credible recommendations.......................................................................................................................................... 22 
        2.4.3 – Low-hanging fruits ........................................................................................................................................................................ 22 
        2.4.4 – Staying the course........................................................................................................................................................................ 22 
2.5 – The Role of Donors.................................................................................................................................................................................. 23 
        2.5.1 – Perceptions of donors................................................................................................................................................................... 23 
        2.5.2 – Need to transfer ownership.......................................................................................................................................................... 24 
        2.5.3 – Setting the Agenda....................................................................................................................................................................... 24 
2.6 – Communication Strategy......................................................................................................................................................................... 25 
        2.6.1 – The need for communications...................................................................................................................................................... 25 
        2.6.2 – Branding........................................................................................................................................................................................ 26 
        2.6.3 – Social Marketing........................................................................................................................................................................... 27 
Part Three: Challenges and Strategies............................................................................................................................................................... 28 
3.1 – CHALLENGE: Reinforcing vested interests............................................................................................................................................ 28 
        3.1.1 – STRATEGY: Be open and transparent........................................................................................................................................ 28 
        3.1.2 – STRATEGY: Create a broad base............................................................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 – CHALLENGE: Big businesses domination excludes SMEs................................................................................................................... 29 
        3.2.1 STRATEGY: Strengthen business associations ............................................................................................................................ 30 
        3.2.2 STRATEGY: Reach out to every entrepreneur equally.................................................................................................................. 31 
3.3 – CHALLENGE: The Talk Shop ................................................................................................................................................................. 31 
        3.3.1 – STRATEGY: Revisit the structure................................................................................................................................................ 32 
        3.3.2 – STRATEGY: Clear agendas with concrete proposals ................................................................................................................ 32 
        3.3.3 – STRATEGY: Manage expectations ............................................................................................................................................. 32 
        3.3.4 – STRATEGY: Make participants accountable to press and peers............................................................................................... 33 
        3.3.5 – STRATEGY: Live and let die........................................................................................................................................................ 33 
3.4 – CHALLENGE: The one-man band.......................................................................................................................................................... 33 
        3.4.1 – STRATEGY: Generate support from the bottom-up ................................................................................................................... 34 
        3.4.2 – STRATEGY: Foster realistic expectations................................................................................................................................... 34 
3.5 – CHALLENGE: Playing politics................................................................................................................................................................. 34 
        3.5.1 – STRATEGY: Use outreach to de-politicise.................................................................................................................................. 35 
        3.5.2 – STRATEGY: Woo parliamentarians and local politicians ........................................................................................................... 35 
3.6 – CHALLENGE: Undermining others......................................................................................................................................................... 35 
        3.6.1 – STRATEGY: Bring existing institutions on board........................................................................................................................ 35 
        3.6.2 – STRATEGY: Include ministerial technical staff........................................................................................................................... 36 
Conclusion.............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 37 
Annex I:   Checklist.................................................................................................................................................................................................. 38 
Annex II:  Online resources ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 42 
Annex III: Partnerships summaries ......................................................................................................................................................................... 45 
Annex IV: Questionnaire to practitioners ................................................................................................................................................................ 51 
Bibliography............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 53 
Index......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 55 Page 4 of 55 
PART ONE: The Payoffs of Partnership 
 
 
Communication is vital for private sector development. 
Governments that listen to the private sector are more likely 
to design credible and workable reforms, while 
entrepreneurs who understand what their government is 
trying to achieve with a program of reforms are more likely to 
accept and support them. Competitiveness partnerships can 
both clarify the incentives and build the capacity of 
governments to implement reforms. Dialogue with 
entrepreneurs not only helps to reveal to governments the 
likely micro-economic foundations for growth, it creates a 
sense of local ownership which makes policies more likely to 
succeed in practice, ideally building a sustainable and self-
reinforcing constituency for reform.  
 
Part One of the paper looks at the range of potential impacts competitiveness partnerships can have. Section 1.1 
illustrates the range of specific policy reforms for which competitiveness partnerships have been responsible. 
Enacting legislation is only the beginning, as changes have to be implemented in practice; section 1.2 shows how 
competitiveness partnerships can help with follow-through. Section 1.3 asks how dialogue can contribute to 
promoting macroeconomic growth. Section 1.4 discusses the ways in which competitiveness partnerships can 
improve transparency and governance, and section 1.5 explores the less tangible but no less critical benefits in 
terms of trust, understanding and social cohesion. 
 
1.1 – Policy Reforms 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can bring about policy reforms by themselves, but they often work by facilitating, 
accelerating or bringing focus to other ongoing initiatives. In  Senegal, for instance, prior to the Council for 
Presidential Investment (CPI) being set up in 2002 “[m]any previous policy recommendations related to private 
sector development had failed to be implemented. The impact of the work of CPI has been to concretize specific 
policy action.”
4 Reforms can include new legislation, the amendment or repeal of existing legislation, removing or 
simplifying regulations and controls, standardizing procedures across different jurisdictions, and setting up new 
institutions. Some examples indicate the variety of concrete outputs that are possible, ranging from broad 
legislative reform to logistical improvements and new institutions: 
 
•  In Vietnam, the Vietnam Business Forum succeeded in amending the Law on 
Business Companies, to streamline licenses and approvals, and loosening 
restrictions on the number of foreigners a business could employ. 
•  In Botswana, the National Business Conference and High Level Consultative 
Council were instrumental in the adoption of a new public procurement and 
asset disposal bill, removal of exchange controls  and adoption of penalty 
clauses for delays in settling invoices.
5 
•  In Turkey, the work of the Coordination Council for the Improvement of the 
Investment Climate (YOIKK) led to a new framework of laws to facilitate 
foreign direct investment and dramatically simplify the procedure of registering 
a new company. 
•  In  Cambodia, a working group of the Private Sector Forum achieved the 
reduction of a punitive toll on a strategically important road.
6 
•  In Malaysia, the internationally-acclaimed Penang Skills Development Center 
(PSDC) arose from a collaboration between government, industry and 
                                                 
4 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005 
5Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr Anthony Land, May 2002, p12 
6Cambodia: Coordinating Bureau of the Private Sector Forum (Supported by International Finance Corporation, Australian Agency for 
International Development) Progress Report January 2002 - January  2004 – James Brew, March 2004, p6 
“Why would I support a reform from my 
government if my government did not bother 
asking my opinion? I am not a politician but I 
know how hard it is to run a business with 
the current regulations. I am not a lawyer but 
I can hint at solutions that the government 
could decide on and implement.”  
 
Zoran Gazibaric, owner of “Nobil, d.o.o.” 
a mattress company, Trvanik, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
“The Tanzania Investor 
Council did not invent 
the Land Act and 
Income Tax Act. But we 
helped define it better 
and we clearly 
accelerated its 
enactment. Without our 
group, it would have 
languished in a 
bureaucratic maze for 
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academia; industry provides most of the funding for the center through a membership scheme.
7 
•  In the Halle-Leipzig-Dessau region of Germany, “a public- private dialogue in the chemical sector developed 
into co-operation between big firms and regional SMEs and the establishment of a network of 50 firms in the 
plastic sector, preparing the creation of a Technological institute for polymers.”
8 
•  In Bosnia, a reduction in the minimum capital requirement for registering LLCs was one of many reforms 
achieved by the Bulldozer Initiative.
9 
  
1.2 – Policy Implementation 
 
Enacting legislation may prove merely symbolic if the new policies 
are not implemented in practice. This can happen if the design of 
reforms fails to take account of practical realities: the quote from 
the  Vietnam internet forum VNBIZ.net (right) illustrates the 
problem. Dialogue has o bvious potential to help ensure that 
reforms are feasible. But there are also reasons why workable new 
legislation can fail to have a practical effect on the core 
constituency: reforms can stall in committee meetings intended to 
fill in details or write new rulebooks; ministries may fail to make 
necessary amendments to related bylaws; enforcement agencies 
may not be instructed about the change and how to implement it; 
necessary new items of paperwork may not be distributed, or 
institutions inadequately staffed or funded. The more closely core 
constituents are involved in each step of implementation, the more 
likely reforms are to succeed in practice. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can help by disseminating awareness of the changes. One of the  Bosnia 
Bulldozer reforms was the abolition of an anachronistic 2% surcharge on building new business premises, 
ostensibly to fund the construction of bomb shelters. A member of the Bulldozer Initiative reported that when he 
subsequently went to the municipal office to register a building permit, the clerk had not been informed about the 
change; had the businessman not been able to show the clerk the official gazette in which the reform was 
published, he would still have been charged the 2% fee even after its official abolition. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can also help by opening up channels of communication and feedback loops. The 
monitoring mechanism in  Mexico’s pact system in the late 1980s was widely seen as crucial in enabling 
government, labor and business groups to police each other’s compliance with agreements. More recently, the 
Mexican Federal Commission for Regulatory Improvement (COFEMER) has incorporated direct feedback from 
entrepreneurs into its “Regulatory Moratorium” process. In 2004, Mexican entrepreneurs used that mechanism to 
argue against 63 specific formalities that, in their opinion, would have had an unnecessary high cost to doing 
business. After scrutiny, 62 of those 63 high-impact regulations were indeed considered as having too-high of a 
negative impact and were thus eliminated before they could reach the legislative process.  
 
Useful information on individual wrongdoing can also arise from competitiveness partnerships: in Botswana, 
discussions of a working group of the High Level Consultative Committee alerted the government to the problem 
of shops near school premises illegally selling alcohol and cigarettes to minors.
10 in Malaysia, dialogue between 
business and the  Malaysian Industrial Development Authority led to a company having its export license 
rescinded for abusing an export subsidy to dump its products domestically.
11 Uganda’s National Forum was also 
used to alert authorities to the abuse of tax breaks given for specific purposes.
12 But the watchdog function of 
                                                 
7Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional Paper 
no 38, September 1999, p25 
8Regional Innovation Strategies of the European Regional Development Fund – Innovative Actions 2000-2002 –  European Commission DG 
Regional Policy, 2002, p11 
9 For a complete list of reforms achieved by the Bulldozer Committee in Bosnia and Herzegovina, please see Investment Climate Reform 
Going the Last Mile: The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Benjamin Herzberg, World Bank, September 2004, or go to 
http://www.bulldozer.ba 
10Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr Anthony Land, May 2002, p12 
11Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia  – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional 
Paper no 38, September 1999, p35 
12Institutional Strategy for the Uganda National Forum – USAID, September 1997, p14 
 “I really wonder, how somebody can 
draft such an irrational, contradicting, 
short-thought, simply stupid document. 
One of the kind that is ten thousand 
times broken the moment it is 
released, and one that cannot be 
followed without bringing Vietnam to a 
stop.” 
Comment regarding a decree 
limiting the number of foreign staff 
in Vietnamese companies, posted 
on VNBIZ.net, a forum on Vietnam 
economic and business issues Page 6 of 55 
competitiveness partnerships should not degenerate into a forum for mutual accusations between competing 
businesses: the mechanism for alerting the relevant authorities to illegal behavior needs to be distinct from the 
partnership’s central function of creating laws which are less easy to abuse. 
 
1.3 – Macro Impact 
 
If competitiveness partnerships are successful in improving investment climate conditions, they will naturally 
have an effect on a country’s macroeconomic situation. It is difficult to measure the specific macroeconomic 
impact of the partnerships because it is generally difficult to isolate their effects from those of other competing 
causes. A rare exception is Mexico, where there is a clear and accepted link between the public-private pact 
process of the late 1980s and success in bringing hyperinflation under control.
13 But generally it is difficult to 
establish concrete statistical evidence linking reforms brought about by dialogue to employment or poverty 
indicators, so only suggestive evidence can be adduced.  
 
The most obvious circumstantial evidence comes from the role of competitiveness partnerships in promoting 
reforms often associated with macro benefits: for example, it would be expected that reforms such as those 
achieved in Senegal by Presidential Investors’ Council – rationalizing incentive regimes, reducing income taxes 
and adopting a new investment code  – should lead to more investment and consequently growth. When 
dialogue leads to greater stability and predictability in the legislative and regulatory environment, investors 
should feel more confident in entering a country: there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that foreign direct 
investment increased in  Bosnia because of the favorable coverage the Bulldozer Initiative received in the 
international press, with positive articles in the London Times, New York Times and Financial Times.  
 
Further circumstantial evidence of the value of competitiveness partnerships is the importance which the 
European Union places on them as a tool of improving regional and national economies. Social dialogue “played 
a decisive role in the adaptation process towards the Maastricht convergence criteria”.
14 The EU has identified 
public-private dialogue as the first “key principle” of its Regional Innovation Strategies, aimed at improving the 
competitiveness of EU regions by enhancing businesses’ ability to innovate.
15 The EU also requires a 
commitment to dialogue from applicant countries; in  Croatia, for example, an EU Opinion has noted that 
“[b]usiness associations are consulted by the government, but further efforts are needed to institutionalize 
business advocacy and public-private dialogue.”
16 When considering its EU application, the Czech Republic 
identified public-private dialogue as the best way to “work out solutions for tackling the high costs to be incurred 
by operators in meeting the standards set out in the acquis” for road transport.
17 
 
There are compelling reasons to believe that a well-functioning competitiveness partnership should place a 
country in a better position to achieve improvements in investment, jobs and growth, and the World Bank has 
recognized the potential for dialogue to contribute to poverty reduction by incorporating input from Investor 
Councils recently set up in five African countries into its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
18 But more data is 
needed to establish the extent and nature of the link. 
 
1.4 – Good governance 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can improve 
the quality of governance – both public and 
corporate  – in three ways: by setting an 
example; by shedding light on the workings 
of institutions; and by improving the quality 
of advice which the government receives 
from the private sector. 
 
                                                 
13Consultative Mechanisms in Mexico – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional Paper no 38, March 2000, p20 
14Social Dialogue and EMU in the Candidate Countries: Estonia, Malta, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2003 
15Regional Innovation Strategies of the European Regional Development Fund – Innovative Actions 2000-2002 –  European Commission DG 
Regional Policy, 2002, p8 
16Opinion on Croatia's Application for Membership of the European Union – Commission of the European Communities, April 2004, p87 
17 http://www.iru.org/EUenlargement/Czech.E.html 
18 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, June 2005. 
“The Bulldozer Initiative alerted politicians to the stimulating 
notion that they could win public support by embracing reform 
every bit as much as they could win public support by opposing 
reform.” 
Kevin Sullivan, Communication Specialist and 
Spokesperson, Office of the High Representative, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina Page 7 of 55 
1.4.1 – Setting an example 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can set an example of transparency and dynamism in cultures where governance 
may traditionally be more opaque and slow-moving. Bosnia’s Bulldozer Initiative adopted a policy of openness 
with the media about its dealings with governments, which led to journalists developing a taste for detailed and 
accurate information about the legislative process; building capacity among the local media has clear potential to 
translate into an improvement in the quality of governance. It also led to a gradual change in attitudes among 
local politicians, who came to see the potential for winning votes by advocating reforms and making themselves 
more accessible to the press.  
 
1.4.2 – Shedding light on institutions 
 
Competitiveness partnerships allow the private sector to monitor the government’s performance more closely, 
and the view is often expressed that this creates valuable opportunities for exposing instances of corruption. The 
High Level Consultative Council in Botswana provides a “mechanism for monitoring public-sector performance”, 
and private sector members of  Uganda’s National Forum felt it helped to “keep government honest”.
19 In 
Senegal, the Presidential Investors’ Council led to an act establishing a “corruption council”. 
 
The pressure of scrutiny can work both ways: businesspeople who take the opportunity of high-profile 
involvement in competitiveness partnerships to criticize the public sector for poor governance stand to lose more 
from exposure of their own poor governance practices. In Mauritius, more than 60 CEOs of the Joint Economic 
Council created and ratified the “Code of Conduct by Enterprises” in October 2001.
20 Regardless of the impact 
that such codes prove to have, the very fact that the issue of corporate governance is moved onto the public 
agenda is valuable. 
 
There is even scope for international donor agencies to improve their performance under the pressure of scrutiny 
brought about by competitiveness partnerships which they sponsor or mediate: stakeholders can find the work of 
international donor agencies obscure, and competitiveness partnerships force those agencies to defend their 
policy preferences to the stakeholders affected by them.  
 
1.4.3 – Improving private sector input into policy design 
 
Without the structure provided by competitiveness partnerships, business advocacy can involve individual firms 
lobbying for reforms regardless of their impacts on other sectors. In Bulgaria, fertilizer producers successfully 
lobbied for 40% duty on imports of fertilizers, then increased prices with the result that farmers began to lobby for 
the duty's abolition.
21 Competitiveness partnerships establish a formal mechanism through which reform 
proposals must pass, allowing the ramifications of measures to be discussed before they are proposed to 
government, transforming self-centered lobbying into a more structured input and ideally nurturing in the private 
sector a more holistic view of the interests of the wider economy. When governments can be confident that the 
input they receive from the private sector is legitimate, in the sense that it reflects the well-considered advice of a 
broad spectrum of interests, there are clear potential gains for the quality of lawmaking. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships establish a means for determining when a proposal is in the interest of the country 
as a whole. One of the reforms supported by the Bosnia Bulldozer committee was the removal of a tax on 
distributing free sales catalogues. Only one company operated in the sector, Neckermann d.o.o., and its 
                                                 
19Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr Anthony Land, May 2002, p12; Institutional 
Strategy for the Uganda National Forum – USAID, September 1997, p14 
20http://www.jec-mauritius.org 










input Page 8 of 55 
lobbying against the tax had previously been seen as self-interested; the Bulldozer committee established that 
removing the tax would encourage new entrants into the Bosnian catalogue sales market, a fact which 
Neckermann welcomed as it believed it would gain more from growth of the sector than it would lose through 
competition. The structure of a competitiveness partnership made clear that an ostensibly self-seeking demand 
would, in fact, benefit both other businesses and many consumers. 
 
There is evidence that competitiveness partnerships can succeed in nurturing more thoughtful input from 
businesses. Before the establishment of a Private Sector Forum Coordinating Bureau to clarify and oversee the 
activities of pre-existing working groups in Cambodia, “the issues raised reflected more the patronage structure 
of Cambodia and were more company specific rather than broadly representative of issues concerning the 
private sector”; the Coordinating Bureau has worked to create a climate of focus on broader issues.
22 
Businesses in Malaysia initially used the competitiveness partnership to lobby for industry-specific benefits, but 
gradually came to realize that the government respected them more for taking a broader view and demonstrating 
commitment to helping the nation as a whole.
23  
 
Competitiveness partnerships structured by industry cluster (as opposed to by policy issue) can be especially 
effective in helping businesses to focus and rationalize their message to policymakers. An example is one of the 
Bosnia Bulldozer Initiative’s reforms, in which a group of eleven private land surveying and geodesy companies 
came together to propose the reform of a law which effectively gave a state entity a monopoly over allocating 
work. Other examples can be found in Nigeria, where the IFC has facilitated dialogues in two states based on a 
cluster approach. USAID has practiced the cluster approach more than any other agency and found it a valuable 
way to identify and challenge regulatory issues and reduce productivity losses. The World Bank, although not in 
a systematic way, has also included dialogue components to several of its “competitiveness clusters” projects, 
with for instance some success in the states of Chihuahua or Campeche in Mexico or in El Salvador
24.  
 
There is naturally a risk that competitiveness partnerships can be highjacked into disguising self-seeking 
lobbying as altruistic advocacy. This is a challenge addressed in part three. 
 
1.5 – Trust, understanding and social cohesion 
 
An atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding 
between the public and private sectors facilitates 
reform efforts. Competitiveness partnerships can 
build trust and understanding simply by bringing 
people together on a regular basis and allowing them 
to get to know each other. A civil servant in Malaysia 
characterized the pre-competitiveness partnership 
situation thus: “Civil servants were not supposed to 
fraternize with business. As a result, they used to be 
completely isolated from real world issues. They 
would do all of their thinking and planning by reading 
books and going to libraries.”
25 While there are 
inherent risks in fostering closer ties between 
politicians and businessmen in countries without functioning democratic safeguards (discussed in 3.1 below), 
there is also clear potential for greater contact to result in a more smoothly functioning economy. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships have had well-established success in improving relations between politicians and 
entrepreneurs. A study of the effects of dialogue in  Botswana is typical in finding that “[m]ost respondents 
commented on the positive evolution of attitudes and relationships between the private sector and the 
government”.
26 In Cambodia, a “little acknowledged but important component of the PSF [Private Sector Forum] 
process has been the sharing of information and the clarification of government policy and planning. This has 
                                                 
22Cambodia: Coordinating Bureau of the Private Sector Forum (Supported by International Finance Corporation, Australian Agency for 
International Development) Progress Report January 2002 - January  2004 – James Brew, March 2004, p10 
23Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia  – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional 
Paper no 38, September 1999, p33 
24 Sonia Plaza, Senior Corporate Strategy Officer, World Bank, correspondence, June 2005 
25Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia  – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional 
Paper no 38, September 1999, p16 
26Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr Anthony Land, May 2002, p11 
“This event was one of the most pragmatic and 
constructive exchanges the VBF has had in the past 
several years, and the continuing improvement of 
the quality of the conversation between the business 
community and the Government was impressive to 
all who have been involved in the VBF.” 
Fred Burke on the Vietnam Business Forum, in 
the Australian Business Group of Vietnam 
Business E-Journal, July 2003.  Page 9 of 55 
little to do with removing actual constraints but it does allow the private sector an opportunity to better 
understand the changes in the environment that they are operating in. Relationships both within the private 
sector and between the private sector and the government had been strained in Cambodia, but with PSF 
working groups reaching out to about 500-1000 small businesses each, there is a gradual change in 




An important way in which competitiveness 
partnerships can bring about improved trust is by 
changing the image of private sector actors in 
society. In  Bosnia, the Bulldozer Initiative 
succeeded in shifting the perceptions of a public 
which had previously tended to regard 
entrepreneurs as parasitic, and instead resulted in 
them being seen as having a valuable contribution 
to make to society. The Vietnam Business Forum 
has also been instrumental in changing public 
perceptions of businesspeople. Despite their 
important role in society, Vietnamese entrepreneurs still have an image problem: “In Vietnam's films and novels, 
they are often portrayed as untrustworthy, unreliable, greedy, short-sighted, and lacking professional education 
and experience…. the public thinks of private businessmen as opportunistic people who will do anything  – 
including exploitation  – just to make a profit, a view that many government officials believe stems from 
Communist ideology.”
28 Vietnam’s government designated October 13
th 2004 as “Entrepreneurs’ Day” to raise 
public awareness of the business community’s positive role in building the country. 
 
Changing perceptions and increasing trust can have benefits broader than improving the investment climate. 
The Bulldozer Initiative was instrumental in building civic society in  Bosnia, getting the country’s seven 
parliaments to work in unison for the first time. There is increasing recognition of the potential for 
competitiveness partnerships to assist in post-conflict situations by focusing attention on an issue which cuts 
across many ethnic, religious and political divides: creating the climate for grassroots entrepreneurs to generate 
wealth. A partnership modeled on the Bulldozer initiative is being set up in Kosovo.
29 East Timor has been 
suggested as another ideal candidate for a competitiveness partnership to build civic society, after “centuries of 
colonialism and decades of foreign occupation, during which all positions of responsibility or of higher 
remuneration were held by expatriates”; the combination of low levels of technical and administrative skills in 
both government and business, and the opportunity of oil revenues, suggest that public-private dialogue can 
play a significant role in bringing people together.
30 Keen to promote such an agenda, the World Bank is 
currently helping set up a public private dialogue and an initial plenary session should inaugurate the  East 
Timor initiative in the coming months
31. With a similar aim, the OECD held a seminar on public-private 
partnership in the Democratic Republic of Congo in Kinshasa in April 2003, which has led to the formation of 
an exploratory follow-up committee.
32 In Sudan, the World Bank is sponsoring a series of dialogues over a 12-
month period to discuss the role of the private sector in reconstruction and development
33. Aimed at promoting 
the investment climate agenda and at tackling issues related to trade and development, such initiative may also 
contribute to the emergence of consensual policy decisions between the north and the south, hence help sustain 
a very fragile peace. In neighboring Chad, the IFC is sponsoring the creation of a business forum, through which 
business enabling environment constraints could be identified, solutions could be suggested and reform 
implementation could be monitored
34. Still in design at the time of writing, this business forum, through a bi-
partisan, business-centric and dialogue-oriented approach to potentially contentious issues, could contribute to 
increase the stability of this relatively fragile state.  
 
 
                                                 
27James Brew, Operation Officer, IFC, questionnaire. 
28 Vietnam Style, http://www.vn-style.com/viewDetails.asp?catId=4&PostId=19312 
29 Kosovo Collective Reform Initiative Advocacy Mechanism Final Report – SEGURA/IP3 Partners, USAID Mission for Kosovo  
30Public-Private Partnerships for Development – Jorge Braga de Macedo, José Braz and Francisco Mantero, March 2003  
31 Wilfrid Bernard Drum, Lead Private Sector Development Specialist, World Bank, correspondence, April 2005. 
32Peer Review and Public Private Partnership in Developing Countries – Jorge Braga de Macedo, December 2003 
33 Private Sector Development in Sudan’s Post-Conflict Recovery, Magdi Amin, World Bank , PSD in Post Conflict Workshop, June 2005. 
34 Establishment of a Public-Private Dialogue Forum in Chad, James Emery, IFC, Project proposal, June 2005. 
 
"The government is aware that business people 
have become a pioneering force in boosting the 
nation's economic development and international 
integration. I hope that Entrepreneurs' Day will help 
change society's ill will and discrimination toward 
the business community."  
Phan Van Khai, Prime Minister of Vietnam, 
quoted in Vietnam Style, October 20
th, 2004. Page 10 of 55 
PART TWO: Options & Advice 
 
 
Part Two considers six key factors in setting up and running a competitiveness partnership: ignition, organizing 
participation, structure, setting and reaching goals, the role of donors, and communications strategy. Drawing on 
the experiences of competitiveness partnerships across the world, this part of the paper illustrates different 
approaches to structuring public-private dialogue and seeks to identify successful strategies that seem likely to 
be replicable. When the authors have considered it useful to extrapolate from relatively limited and/or recent 
experience more liberally than would normally be justifiable in a paper of this nature, they have separated and 
labeled that advice accordingly.  
 
A summary matrix and a checklist of issues to consider while building or maintaining a partnership is presented 
to practitioners in Annex II.  
 
2.1 – Ignition 
 
This section identifies the factors that often help to get a competitiveness partnership started: political will, 
credibility, an institutional vacuum, and a sense of urgency or crisis. It concludes by illustrating how 
competitiveness partnerships can be conceived in four dimensions: the relative strength of government, the 
private sector, donor involvement and logistical facilities. 
 
2.1.1 – Political will matters more than legal status 
 
Successful competitiveness partnerships have been started because business lobbies for dialogue, because 
government initiates dialogue or because international donors bring the parties together. It can be difficult to 
disentangle these factors: in Bosnia, the initial impetus for the Bulldozer Initiative was “top-down” in that the 
international community organized outreach to grassroots entrepreneurs and lobbied the government to 
implement the reforms proposed, but the process was designed to be “bottom-up” in that the ideas and political 
pressure for reforms came from the core constituents rather than international donors.  Sometimes the 
involvement of a particular individual is needed: in Nigeria, the Better Business Initiative arose from the personal 
input of Pr. Charles Soludo, an academic highly respected in both business and government circles.  
 
Whether the initial impetus comes from the private or public sector, international donors or a respected 
individual, the most critical factor seems to be the willingness of government to engage in dialogue and commit 
to the reform process. The business community will rarely turn down a genuine offer of consultation, and 
competitiveness partnerships can succeed without the involvement of donors. But when  government 
commitment to dialogue is less than whole-hearted, little seems possible – an illustrative example is Zimbabwe 
in the late 1990s, when the consultation mechanisms set up in response to private sector lobbying broke down 
amid a widespread perception that they were too tightly politically controlled.
35  
 
It seems to be relatively unimportant what legal footing the competitiveness partnership takes. A report by the 
European Trade Union Confederation finds no discernible difference between three-way d ialogue (between 
government, unions and business) conducted under a legislative umbrella or by means of less formal 
agreements: “Slovakia has a law on tripartism (since 1999), whereas tripartism in the Czech Republic is based 
on an agreement concluded between the government and the social partners. This does not prevent the tripartite 
arrangements in these two countries from being virtually identical and social dialogue there has been operating 
relatively well for some time. The recent improvement in tripartite practice in Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
has resulted above all from the change of government attitude in this particular area.”
36 
 
2.1.2 – Creating and adapting institutions 
 
Competitiveness partnerships often arise from an institutional vacuum created by the obvious failure of an 
existing consultation mechanism. In  Bosnia, the Social Economic Council was a broad-based consultation 
mechanism which lacked adequate funding or commitment, creating a vacuum which the Bulldozer Initiative was 
able to fill. Or an existing mechanism may have become diverted or captured, as happened to Nigeria’s National 
                                                 
35Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa – USAID, October 2001 
36Social Dialogue in European Union Candidate Countries – European Trade Union Confederation, September 2001 – 
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Economic Summit Group, which gradually moved away from representing SMEs and led to e ntrepreneur 
frustration which has recently found an outlet in the Better Business Initiative.  
 
Often institutions such as Chambers of Commerce exist but fail to perform to their full potential; in several of the 
African countries in which the World Bank h as recently helped to set up Investors Councils, Chambers of 
Commerce were characterized by  “fragmentation, membership apathy and resource problems”.
37 This can 
present both an opportunity and a threat: in Mali, the Chambers have been brought onto the Investors Council to 
represent the interests of local companies. In  Bosnia, the Chambers were initially hostile to the Bulldozer 
Initiative as they saw it as their prerogative to represent business interests – not least because one of the more 
popular Bulldozer reforms was an end to compulsory Chamber membership fees. Ultimately, though, the 
Chambers came to see the Initiative not as a threat but as an opportunity to reinvigorate themselves. 
 
The obvious success of a consultation mechanism that is limited in scope may also make clear that there is an 
institutional vacuum to be filled. An agency to promote foreign investment which dialogues well with foreign 
investors may gradually lead to a common realization that local investors face the same problems and should 
also have a forum. The government representative on the Vietnam Business Forum came to the role from a 
position as head of the foreign investment promotion agency. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships generally function more effectively when care is taken to build on existing 
institutions (the consequences of institutional duplication are discussed in 3.6 below). Sometimes, as with 
Cambodia’s Private Sector Forum, there are no existing institutions; in such circumstances, a good way to get 
started is for a sponsor to conduct field research identifying issues for local entrepreneurs and then hold a forum 
for public and private sector leaders. This approach has been followed with success in the World Bank’s efforts 
to bring public-private dialogue to regional levels of government in Indonesia: “The focus groups and interviews 
followed by preparation of an issues paper and selection of speakers, who later addressed the main issues on 
the day of the forum itself, proved very effective.”
38 
 
2.1.3 – Establishing credibility  
 
Especially when there is a history of antagonism between the government and business community, it is 
important to establish credibility at an early stage. Several attempts to initiate dialogue in  Ghana during the 
administration of General Jerry Rawlings failed because of a pervasive “atmosphere of rancor and mistrust... 
government and business representatives traded accusations of the other side's lack of seriousness”.
39  
 
In such cases the government should try to build credibility little by little, perhaps by making highly visible 
commitments which can be verified in a short period of time. In Mexico, the pacts between government and 
representatives of business and labor designed to tackle the economic crisis of the mid-1980s featured 
agreements that endured for short amounts of time, as little as one month; this enabled the government to 
demonstrate commitment and build credibility for longer-term promises.
40 In  Malaysia, the government 
established credibility through early reforms including the dismissal of incompetent Malay managers of state-
owned enterprise, assuaging the Chinese business community’s perceptions of ethnic favoritism.
41 In Bosnia, 
many entrepreneurs waited for the government to enact the first batch of 50 proposed reforms before engaging 
in a second phase of the initiative. 
 
The early and high-profile involvement of highly-regarded individuals in the business community can also be 
critical in building credibility among fellow entrepreneurs. Mary Agboli, who worked for the International Finance 
Corporation on the Abia and Anambra State Implementation Committees in Nigeria, emphasizes the importance 
of local champions: “Early identification of key players in both the public and private sector who are willing and 
can devote their own non-financial resources to get both sides around the table has been very useful. From my 
                                                 
37 Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005 
38City of Balikpanan Report on a Regional Private Sector Forum  - Bernard Drum, Megawati Sulistyo and Haryunani Kumololoras, World 
Bank, June 2002 
39Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – Joseph Ayee (university of Ghana), Michael 
Lofchie (UCLA) and Carolina Wieland (UCLA), World Bank Private Sector Development Department, October 1999, p29 
40Consultative Mechanisms in Mexico – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional Paper no 38, March 2000, p45 
41Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia  – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional  
Paper no 38, September 1999, p15 Page 12 of 55 
experience, these individuals are usually people who have significant influence on both sides and can not only 
get the actors to sit down and talk to each other but also can push identified reforms.”
42 
 
2.1.4 – Urgency, crisis and imaginary deadlines 
 
While political and economic stability increase the chances of a partnership succeeding in the long run, a sense 
of urgency or crisis may help to start the process. In Mexico, it was an economic crisis which provided the 
impetus for the 1980s pacts between the government, business and labor. A specific problem can serve the 
same purpose: in the Netherlands, a dispute between importers of cut flowers caused by a new EU regulation 
led to the establishment of a dialogue group between the public sector, represented by the Plant Protection 
Service, and private companies, represented by the Horticulture Commodity Board.
43  
 
Competitiveness partnerships may be hard to initiate without a crisis because of the “free rider” problem: if 
businesspeople will benefit from improvements in the business climate brought about by consultation whether or 
not they personally engage in it, there will be a natural temptation to leave it to others to expend the time and 
energy required to participate in dialogue. A sense that there is an urgent need to solve a problem may help to 
overcome this difficulty, and the Mexico pact process illustrates the relative difficulty of moving forward without a 
sense of urgency: when the talks centered on inflation, progress was achieved relatively quickly because all 
sides recognized it was an urgent problem; when they attempted to tackle productivity, the problem was 
perceived as less urgent and the discussions made less progress.
44 
 
The imposition of an arbitrary deadline can help to ignite a competitiveness partnership. The Mexican pact talks 
were held on Friday nights and the participants were forbidden to leave the building until an agreement on a 
particular topic had been reached, which usually happened on Saturday mornings.
45 Similarly, by publicly 
committing to the aim of passing “50 economic reforms in 150 days”, the Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia captured 
the imagination of frustrated entrepreneurs and created a sense of urgency and momentum. The deadline also 
served to assure entrepreneurs that their risk in terms of time commitment was limited, as failure or success 
would be determined in a specified period of time. 
 
2.1.4 – Four Dimensions 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can usefully be conceived of in four dimensions:  
 
•  Government: the public sector must display sufficient capacity, political will and leadership to engage. 
•  Business: the private sector needs to be organized, have leadership and feel a basic sense of security in 
speaking out to government without fear of being penalized. 
•  Sponsor: a champion acting as sponsor needs credibility, expertise and the ability to get media attention. 
•  Instruments: logistical facilities and seed funds.  
 
Mapping the relative strength and weakness of these four dimensions can help to identify the potential for 
success in a competitiveness partnership, and the vulnerable points that need to be addressed; the graphs 
below show the four axes going from weak at the center to strong on the exterior.  
 
Experience suggests that weakness in one area can be compensated for by strength in another – for instance, 
lack of organization in the private sector can be overcome by an energetic donor and/or strong instruments. As 
shown by the diagrams below, in Bosnia, the Bulldozer Initiative faced weakness in the government dimension 
but was able to overcome this with exceptionally strong support from sponsors and with adequate strength of 
instruments and enough support from the private sector. By contrast in Turkey, the Reform Program for the 
Improvement of the Investment Environment derives much less strength from sponsors, the World Bank rather 
playing the role of a partner, but thrives because of strong commitment from the government and a vibrant and 
well-organized private sector. The Vietnam Business Forum provides an example of a process that has, over 
the years, become well balanced between the four dimensions. 
 
                                                 
42Mary Agboli, Business Enabling Environment Specialist, IFC, questionnaire 
43Institutional opportunities for Thai-Dutch co-operation to comply with food safety and pesticide regulations – J.S. Buurma, Wageningen 
University and Research Centre, September 2003 
44Consultative Mechanisms in Mexico – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional Paper no 38, March 2000, p14 
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    OUR ADVICE     
 
Keep membership manageable 
and include intermediaries 
 
The plenary group should contain no 
more than 20 participants and  
should include intermediaries such 
as business associations whenever 
possible, the aim being to reach out 
to thousands of businesses without 
making meetings unwieldy. 
 
 
2.2 – Organizing participation 
 
Selection of participants is vital to a competitiveness partnership’s success. This section discusses the trade-off 
between small-group cohesiveness and broad-group representativeness, the ideal characteristics of participants, 
the importance of high-level support and the question of whether discussions should be limited to businesses 
and government or include labor unions and civil society groups. 
 
2.2.1 – Size of group 
 
Common sense suggests a trade-off which is apparent in practice: 
small groups are easier to organize and more effective at decision-
making, but at the cost of legitimacy if the participants are seen to be 
unrepresentative of the business community as a whole; while larger 
groups are more cumbersome and involve more difficulty in 
maintaining focus, but key stakeholders are less likely to feel 
excluded. A balance must be struck but “attaining an optimal 
composition is an extremely difficult matter”.
46 An example of overly 
broad public sector representation was  Nigeria’s National Council 
on Industrial Development, i n which “the inclusion of all relevant 
institutions at federal and state levels, created a situation where the 
NCID was overwhelmed with public officials”.
47  
                                                 
46Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – Joseph Ayee (university of Ghana), Michael 
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    OUR ADVICE   
 
Reach out to women and minorities 
 
Involving minority communities is 
crucial, as is the participation of women, 
and the organizer must reach out if few 
come forward. Highly visible female 
participation sets an example and helps 
create a more favourable public image. 
 
An example of private sector membership being seen as too narrow and homogenous is provided by the World 
Bank’s Investor Councils in Africa. A significant percentage of the private sector representatives are neither 
resident nor hold investments in the countries involved, and local companies have expressed the view that their 
interests are under-represented.
48 In  Ghana, for example, SMEs in general have only one representative 
organization on the Investment Advisory Council while the Lebanese and Indian entrepreneur community, 
though making a substantial contribution to the Ghanaian economy, have no involvement. 
 
2.2.2 – Selection of participants 
 
Some general rules can be identified: participants should ideally be widely respected, dynamic, open-minded 
and unafraid to speak their minds. A study of public private dialogue for DFID finds that the best private sector 
“champions” for dialogue “have a wide appreciation of business concerns, both by sector and by scale, and a 
strong reputation across government as an honest broker;” DFID has experienced success with such champions 
being motivated individual entrepreneurs, as in the DFID-sponsored Better Regulation Project in Uganda, or 
elected leaders of a formally-constituted association.
49  
 
Experience suggests that consultative mechanisms that have a voluntary element have a greater chance of 
success, as voluntary membership implies a commitment from the participants that goes beyond the obligations 
deriving from financial compensation. The motivation of business advocates varies: benefits such as peer 
recognition, media exposure or business networking are often factors they take into account. But as a general 
rule, advocates with a genuine primary commitment to improve the business environment of their country, or to 
improve civil society at large, will produce better results. An effort to involve both the old and young among 
politicians, businesses and representative organizations can help to create a dynamic mix of ambition and 
experience. 
 
The Investors Councils set up in five African countries by the 
World Bank demonstrate the  importance of involving 
committed individuals: the participation of multinational 
corporations which do not have a presence in a country is an 
experiment which has generated negative feedback, not least 
because many did not attend regularly: a study of the initial 
years of the Councils’ operations recommends that “[n]on-
resident and non-invested members should be included only 
exceptionally”, and that membership should be reviewed 
frequently to ensure that members who do not show sufficient 
commitment can be replaced.
50  
 
A World Bank study of Public-Private Partnerships in 2001 emphasized the need to look for companies to 
include which have a good record of corporate social responsibility, allow labor unions and are environmentally 
responsible.
51 It is necessary to make sure that no good candidates are excluded, and that no unfair advantage 
is gained from inclusion; it is natural that companies may see the potential for business opportunities to arise 
from access to government and donor officials, so the criteria for membership should be written and publicly 
available, allowing all potential partners to express their interest in participating. 
 
2.2.3 – Top-level government involvement 
 
Government representation must be at the highest possible level for the partnership to have credibility: a 
consistent feature of competitiveness partnerships is the correlation between the progress achieved and the 
seniority of government figures involved. The Ghana Investment Advisory Council provides an example of the 
difference that top-level enthusiasm can make: “During the first 18 months, the President sought to delegate 
certain Council leadership responsibilities… Confidence and progress remained uncertain. Greater personal 
                                                                                                                                                                 
47Public-Private Sector Consultative Mechanisms: Assessments of existing arrangements and potentials for a sustained public-private 
partnership in Nigeria – UNIDO, April 2002, p10 
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attention by the President including full involvement in Council meetings and a new Secretariat have been critical 
in dynamizing the Council and driving important policy reforms.”
52 
 
It is also important to have continuity in which public officials attend meetings  –  Nigeria’s N CID suffered 
because “each meeting was attended by different public officials so there was no continuity in membership”.
53 In 
Bosnia, this was resolved by asking the government to name specific counterparts to the Bulldozer Committee 
in each jurisdiction: each prime minister nominated a coordinator within their cabinet, hence relieving themselves 
from the daily dealings with the advocacy group but still ensuring support from the highest instance when 
messages needed to be re-routed to specific ministries. 
 
When local layers of government are involved in decision-making or in implementing decisions reached by 
central government, they should ideally also be included in the partnership process. 
 
2.2.4 – Unions, academics and NGOs 
 
An important and difficult question is whether the partnership should be restricted to government and business 
or also seek to include other stakeholders such as labor unions, academics, NGOs or consumer and 
environmental groups. In Mexico “the inclusion of the labor community in the Pacts made them somewhat more 
inclusive of civil society than is the case with the government-business consultative mechanism structure 
commonly observed in developing nations in the contemporary period”.
54 Labor is strongly represented 
alongside business in South Africa’s National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC), which 
also “ mandates the participation of broader civil society interests (e.g., youth, disabled persons, and rural 
organizations) in one of its four chambers”.
55 Senegal’s Growth and Competitiveness Review Group, set up with 
World Bank support in the early 1990s and now part of the Investment Promotion and Major Projects Agency, 
APIX, drew participants from business both large and small and formal and informal, plus labor unions, 
universities and the media, and was widely regarded as a success.
56  
 
In Malaysia, two parallel routes have been followed: with the Malaysian Business Council, “Labor has been left 
out of the arrangement and the participation of NGOs, academics and others has been peripheral”, whereas the 
Ministry of Finance’s pre-budget consultation process has expanded to include academics, research institutes, 
social groups and NGOs.
57 “Exclusion or illegitimate representation of important constituencies, such as 
organized labor, can lead to poor policy design and lack of support for proposed policies”; it has been suggested 




Sometimes representation can start off narrow and broaden when the time is right. Unions were not involved in 
the first phase of Bosnia’s Bulldozer initiative because it was deemed important for the private sector to build its 
own legitimacy first, having suffered from an unwarranted image problem under socialism. In the second phase 
unions were invited to participate, and although their participation proved largely passive it was a valuable step 
in promoting a collaborative rather than confrontational approach. In the third phase, the structure of dialogue 
was reformed and unions’ involvement expanded. The phased approach proved successful: reaching out to 
include other participants was done at the right moment, and their participation was ensured by finding an 
appropriate forum in which they felt more comfortable to dialogue actively.  
 
A similar approach is being pursued by the Private Sector Forum in Cambodia, where trust levels were so low 
that getting the private sector talking to the government and to each other was sufficiently demanding that any 
attempt to include other stakeholders at an early stage would have been too ambitious; once the principle of 
dialogue has been established between businesses and government, it should become easier to contemplate 
bringing other actors into the equation. 
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But maintaining balance overtime between the interests of the private sector and labor actors is a delicate task. In the 
1990’s in Chile, after democracy was reinstated, the first administration brokered the Tripartite Framework Agreements 
between labor, business and the government, which translated into number successful policies. However, the 
businesspeople pulled out when they perceived the issues to be irrelevant to their immediate interest. During the 
following administration, Álvaro García, Former Minister of the Economy recalls that “a broader effort was made, though 
more focused on economic development, and again some actors (organized labor, this time) desisted from genuine 
participation in the meetings, because they felt that their concerns were not being adequately addressed.”
59 
 
Finally, many European Union candidate countries have adopted forms of tripartite consultation involving trades 
unions as well as government and the private sector, and some have gone beyond this model to include civil 
society groups.  Hungary  has several national-level institutions for dialogue  – the Economic Council brings 
together government, labor, employers and business associations, while the Social Council includes the voices 
of NGOs.
60 When creating the Malta Council for Economic and Social Development in 2001, Malta also set up a 
Civil Society Committee, consisting of the chairpersons of civil society organizations, to represent civil society.
61 
The Bulgarian Competitiveness Initiative recommended the setting up of a National Competitiveness Council 




2.3 – Structure 
 
There are many possible structures for competitiveness partnerships, and as with choosing participants there 
are common-sense balances to be struck: if meetings are too frequent then participants can feel overburdened, 
but excessive infrequency risks inactivity; if the remit is targeted too narrowly it risks getting priorities wrong, if 
too broad it risks an inability to prioritize at all. This section looks at those trade-offs, identifies some key features 
of successful competitiveness partnerships  – notably a well-funded secretariat with working groups  – and 
suggests strategies such as mapping the structure of competitiveness partnerships to government, paying close 
attention to small logistical details and considering the establishment of regional and local fora. 
 
2.3.1 – Looseness vs. rigidity 
 
Relatively informal mechanisms can be good for tackling specific problems but lack sustainability, whereas more 
formal structures may have greater longevity but less dynamism. The  Ugandan experience suggests that 
informal, ad hoc mechanisms can be most effective in the short-term, but participants become frustrated at their 
lack of power.
63 The Bulldozer experience in Bosnia shows how a partnership can evolve from a relatively free-
wheeling form in its first phase into a more structured entity as it gains credibility. 
 
The risk inherent in loose structures is disorganization and lack of credibility – in Bulgaria, the government 
would decide who to consult on a case-by-case basis, leading to resentment from those who felt arbitrarily left 
out; “private parties do not find the form of dialogue  to be effective”.
64 The risk of rigid structures is lack of 
dynamism: Nigeria’s Competitiveness Forum Working Group tended to get bogged down in obscure protocol 
and complicated committee structures (see diagram below); it is hoped that the recent reform of the CFWG into 
the Better Business Initiative will inject more fluidity.  
 
2.3.2 – Secretariats and working groups 
 
A common feature of partnerships that work well is an effective secretariat. The secretariat can be hosted within 
any of the participating members  – an NGO, government ministry, international organization, company or 
business association – or it can be free-standing, with funding from one or more of the participants. In Senegal 
and Uganda, the secretariats of the Investors Councils are located in an investment promotion agency, which is 
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    OUR ADVICE             
 
Competitiveness partnerships need 
dynamic coordinators. They must: 
  
•  Be skilled at communication and 
negotiation.  
•  Understand investment climate 
issues and legal technicalities. 
•  Be very entrepreneurial in approach.  
•  Be equally comfortable talking to 
prime ministers and micro-
entrepreneurs. 
•  Have strong project management 
skills. 
•  Be credible enough to convince 
people to participate (sometimes a 
foreigner who lacks baggage with 
locals can be a good choice).  
a model that seems to work well.
65 It needs to have dedicated people to organize meetings, set agendas, rally 











Working groups are also a common feature of successful competitiveness partnerships (see schematized figure 
above). Usually they meet more frequently than plenary groups to consider a particular issue and they have a 
head who deals with other working groups and the secretariat, by which they are coordinated and supervised. 
They can be effectively be arranged by industry cluster (such as 
agriculture, tourism or manufacturing), by policy issue (such as 
deregulation, infrastructure or labor) or by region, grouping all the 
members from one geographical location.  
 
A survey of advisors working in dialogue for DFID found a consensus 
that “sectoral dialogue is the most effective in producing results.”
66 In 
Japan, deliberation councils are structured both according to topic 
and industry. Turkey and Vietnam, both considered to be successful 
role models, organize their working groups by sectors.  In Bosnia, 
the organization of the Bulldozer’s working groups was geographical.  
 
Geographical grouping has the advantage that members from the 
same regions can meet more frequently, network more effectively, 
and present a single voice to local authorities and constituents. 
Regional working groups also reduce the risk of particular regions 
being under-represented in sector- or issue-oriented groups, 
undermining their legitimacy. But for making policy proposals, 
working groups organized by sector or issue are more effective as 
they can gather all the relevant technical expertise in one place.  
 
2.3.3 – The rhythm of meetings 
 
A further common-sense trade-off is that frequent meetings may place too high a burden on busy professionals 
unless results are quickly apparent, while infrequent meetings may not be able to achieve results at all. The most 
successful competitiveness partnerships are characterized by plenary meetings which are regular but not too 
frequent; three month intervals seems to be a good guideline (working groups should be able to sustain more 
intense activity). Preparatory work between meetings minimizes the risk of those meetings been seen as an 
energy-sapping waste of time. In Bosnia, while the plenary sessions of the Bulldozer Committee would run for 
five hours non stop, the two or three months between meetings were times of intense preparation which allowed 
participants to review and resolve many concrete issues during the course of each meeting. Heads of working 
groups could go back to their members with news on the fate of specific proposals and a meaningful update on 
overall progress, maintaining the sense of momentum. 
 
Planning is critical. A competitiveness partnership has more chance to succeed if a detailed timetable is agreed 
upon well in advance by the participants, detailing when each working group should deliver their input, when 
plenary meetings will take place, and when other events such as press conferences will take place. Clear 
timetables not only enable the participants to plan their time in advance; when communicated publicly, they also 
help to create internal pressure on the participants to meet their own deadlines.  
                                                 
65Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005 
66 Reforming the Business Enabling Environment: Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue – Matthew Gamser, 














Private sector advocates, associations, government representatives, donors Page 18 of 55 
 
The Vietnam Business Forum is linked 
to the Ministry of Planning and Industry. 
Its membership is organized along 
sectoral working groups. 
Before being simplified into the Better Business Initiative, the Nigerian “Competitiveness 
Working Group” had a structure that could lead to confusion.  “First Circle” members 
interacted with “Second Circle” ones, while being coordinated by “Working Group 
Chairs” and a “Committee of Sponsor”. The multiplication of acronyms and floating 
groups can create accountability issues. Page 19 of 55 
  
In the Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the private sector is organized in 
regional committees that partner with Emergency Reform Units for each government 
jurisdictions. A Coordination unit monitors and regulates the process, while being the 
point of contact with the international organizations. 
In Turkey, the YOIIK is directly linked to the Council of Ministers. A simple but efficient 
structure allows for equal treatment between different “Technical Committees” that mostly 
map the existing structure of the ministerial administration, allowing the leverage of 
energies within the administration to implement the priorities identified in working groups.  Page 20 of 55 
 
2.3.4 – Logistical details 
 
Seemingly minor logistical details must not be overlooked. In  Cambodia, it was found that arranging the 
meetings at lunchtimes and in the evening, and providing refreshments, made busy businesspeople more likely 
to make the time to attend.
67 In Ghana, a simple lack of forward planning seriously hindered one partnership’s 
effectiveness: “Often, the invitations to [Private Sector Roundtable] meetings would arrive only the day before 
the meeting itself, or the invitation to join a trade delegation would not allow sufficient time to reorganize a busy 
work schedule”.
68 In Bolivia, the credibility of the National Dialogue was undermined by poor logistics: “As they 
had received the invitation to the Dialogue workshop only three weeks before the event, and the background 
documents even later, many [Civil Society Organizations] felt disadvantaged in their capacity to participate. The 
short preparation time made it impossible to consult their own counterparts and constituencies, and as a result, 
some chose not to participate at all.”
69 
 
2.3.5 – Mapping the partnership’s structure to the government’s 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can be more effective in pushing through reforms if they are integrated into the 
existing structure of government – a labor working group matching the remit of to the labor ministry, a trade 
working group considering the issues dealt with by the trade ministry, and so forth. The deliberation councils in 
Japan are closely integrated into the government’s ministerial structure. An alternative route was pursued by the 
Bosnia Bulldozer Initiative with limited success: Emergency Reform Units were set up in each governmental 
entity and charged with receiving, analyzing and coordinating the response to the Bulldozer’s recommendations.  
 
When the partnership does not have direct links with the relevant decision-makers – for instance, when it is set 
up as an adjunct to the president’s office – it can find its reforms being blocked as they travel down the chain of 
command.
70 This problem can be overcome with sufficient political will, but taking account of the government’s 
structure when devising the competitiveness partnership should minimize the chances of difficulty. 
 
2.3.6 – Local and Regional Groups 
 
The structure of government may dictate the importance of targeting competitiveness partnerships at the local or 
regional level. If significant decision-making authority rests with local tiers of government, competitiveness 
partnerships should clearly not  focus their attention solely at the federal level.  In  Poland, Provincial 
Commissions for Social Dialogue conduct tripartite dialogue on a local level.
71 In Indonesia, while the Private 
Sector Forum has operated at a national level for several years, increasing devolution to the regions has led the 
World Bank to organize exploratory forums about public-private dialogue in East Kalimantan, Surabaya, East 
Java and Makassar. The findings of initial research indicate the value of a regional focus: decentralization has 
imposed on regions a responsibility to fund themselves partially through direct taxation, and in meetings 
organized by the Bank, “many businessmen strongly criticized local governments for using their new regulatory 
powers to focus more on income generation than on promoting a favorable business environment.”
72  
 
Regional approaches can often profitably be combined with an industry cluster approach; USAID in particular 
have focused on promoting dialogue in regional industry clusters, with considerable success. The high-value 
agriculture sector in Western Thailand has seen dialogue lead to the adoption of rules on “Good Agricultural 
Practices”.
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A report for DFID identifies two further advantages of working with local government. Firstly, it often happens 
that “[l]arge degrees of decentralization mean that often local governments are better run and organised, and 
have more resources” than their federal counterparts, making them a better focal point for dialogue. Secondly, 
local organisation makes it easier to involve entrepreneurs from small businesses, who are often located in rural 
areas and lack the ability to travel to meetings in the capital city: in Nicaragua, DFID adopted a local approach 
to dialogue for this reason.
75 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can also transcend national boundaries when the c ircumstances make it 
advisable. As the US Ambassador to Thailand put it when advocating cross-national public-private dialogue in 
the tourism sector,  “Tourists don’t think in national boundary terms  – they want adventure tourism in both 
Thailand and Laos; they want to visit archaeological sites in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam; they want cultural 
experiences that give them a taste of the great variety in the region.”
76 In such cases there is clear potential for a 
regional competitiveness partnership to improve an economic sector.  
 
2.4 – Setting and reaching goals 
 
Competitiveness partnerships can yield both hard and soft results, but the soft benefits – such as trust, cohesion 
and social capital – tend to arise as by-products from striving for outputs which are more easily quantifiable, such 
as policy reforms, position papers and conferences. This section identifies possible quantifiable measures for 
success and notes the importance of focusing on “quick wins”, producing clear and credible recommendations 
and following through with monitoring and accountability mechanisms.  
 
2.4.1 – Policy reforms 
 
Intended outputs can be more or less ambitious, ranging in scope from holding conferences and producing 
discussion papers to enabling legislative programs. There is often some difficulty in proposing quantifiable 
measures for success. Some possibilities are:  
 
•  The holding of an annual forum, as happens in Vietnam. 
•  The target of “50 economic reforms in 150 days” of  Bosnia’s Bulldozer, each reform being a specific 
regulatory change. 
•  To “double the level of innovation by having at least 20% of all enterprises introducing some new product, 
process or service in the previous two years”, as adopted by the Shannon region of Ireland as part of the 
EU’s Risk Innovation Strategies.
77 
•  An aim for improvement in a country’s ranking in indices  – such as the World Bank’s Doing Business 
indicators, the World Economic Forum’s Growth Competitiveness index, or the OECD’s Human Development 
Index – which is among the objectives adopted by Nigeria’s Better Business Initiative.  
 
 
                                                 
75 Reforming the Business Enabling Environment: Mechanisms and Processes for Private-Public Sector Dialogue – Matthew Gamser, 
Richard Waddington and Rebecca Kadritzke, DFID/Bannock Consulting Ltd., March 2005 
76Competitiveness: How It Helps Thailand – Darryl N Johnson, US Ambassador to Thailand, Cluster Competitiveness in South-East Asia 
Conference, September 2004 
77Regional Innovation Strategies of the European Regional Development Fund – Innovative Actions 2000-2002 –  European Commission DG 
Regional Policy, 2002, p9 
 
Our advice: Focusing on this goal sets a good stage for 
reaching the others 
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OUR ADVICE            
 
Aim for a tiered output:  
Roadblocks and Roadmaps. 
 
We recommend that a 
competitiveness partnership 
develops a set number of targeted 
proposals (called, for example, 
“Business Roadblocks”), 
together with a smaller number of 
high quality, longer and research-
based economic policy papers (eg 
“Business Roadmaps”). The 
Roadblocks promise concrete 
outcomes and instant gratification, 
while the Roadmaps build 
credibility by putting the 
Roadblocks in context. 
   
But even if success in meeting goals may be measurable only subjectively and anecdotally, the goals are still 
worth setting. 
 
Focus on policy reforms – which can be defined as any change in a legislative or administrative system that will 
impact the end users of that system – is a common thread of many partnerships. This covers a broad range of 
meanings: passing a full new law, a change in an internal procedure in a local administration, amendments to an 
article in a law, a ministerial instruction, a change in the way licenses or permits are handled, a different tax rate, 
a harmonization of procedures, and so forth. Japan’s deliberation councils show what can be achieved when 
consultation accumulates legitimacy by being seen to work well over a period of time – policies approved by the 
councils are implemented almost routinely, whereas any proposal emanating from the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry that has not passed through a deliberation council has little chance of passing parliament.
78 
 
2.4.2 – Clear and credible recommendations 
 
Recommendations to government w hich emerge from 
competitiveness partnerships must be clear, well-researched and 
compellingly presented, and must pass through a filtering process so 
they are seen by all the actors as legitimate. The failure of the Private 
Sector Roundtable in Ghana was partially attributed to the fact that 
its recommendations were “overly vague and, due to poor 
background research, failed to include analysis of such vital matters 
as cost implications”, and furthermore were not accompanied by a 
realistic timetable for implementation.
79  
 
Although policy reform recommendations should be specific, that 
doesn’t mean they can’t be presented on more than one level. The 
Better Business Initiative in  Nigeria  both identifies “Business 
Bottlenecks”, individual problems needing individual solutions, and 
publishes “Business Roadmaps”, taking a birds-eye view of the 
business landscape and describing the broader context for required 
reforms. In both Nigeria and  Bosnia  it has been found that the 
process of collecting ideas, for “bottlenecks” or “roadblocks” 
respectively, brought benefits to civic society in terms of spreading 
awareness of the potential of advocacy to achieve change. 
 
2.4.3 – Low-hanging fruits 
 
A strategy which has paid dividends in many competitiveness partnerships is to place early emphasis on reforms 
that are relatively easily achievable. The Presidential Investors Council in Senegal enjoyed early success by 
concentrating on forcing through the implementation of changes which had already achieved wide consensus in 
principle between the public and private sectors.
80 The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia took care to propose no 
major structural changes in its first phase of reforms, but small and manageable ones that could command 
widespread support and be implemented without provoking too powerful opposition. 
 
2.4.4 – Staying the course 
 
Reforms take place in the context of an often complex process: for instance, a suggestion may need to find a 
ministerial sponsor, get executive approval for submission to parliament, be approved by two chambers of 
parliament – which may involve several readings and perhaps committee stages and public hearings – and be 
published in an official gazette. Then there may need to be communication of the change to local administrative 
agencies, updating of rulebooks, amendment of by-laws and procedures, training of personnel, etc. The most 
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successful competitiveness partnerships are the ones that recognize reforms can founder at any stage and build 
monitoring and accountability mechanisms into their initial structure. 
 
There are many examples of recommendations that are agreed upon and accepted by government but never 
actually happen: as a member of Uganda’s National Forum told USAID, for instance, some of the “reforms take 
place on paper only.  Still others never surface at all and appear to be cloaked in government secrecy”.
81 World 
Bank consultations with small entrepreneurs while investigating the formation of a competitiveness partnership in 
the Makassar region of Indonesia uncovered a typical example of a reform which looks good on paper but has 
little effect in reality: in response to complaints about the difficulty of obtaining the required licenses to operate a 
business, the regional government had two years previously set up a “one-stop shop”. Far from solving the 
problem, though, entrepreneurs related that they still needed to visit as many bureaucrats, collect as many 
signatures and make as many informal payments as before.
82 
 
Monitoring and accountability mechanisms help to prevent 
participants becoming frustrated at lack of concrete 
progress and losing interest in the process. Building a 
monitoring mechanism into the structure can help to 
improve credibility: as part of  Mexico’s pact process, a 
high-level monitoring committee met weekly to assess 
compliance with agreements on the part of government, 
business and labor, facilitating efforts to sanction firms or 




Active outreach and publicity programs can also help to 
create political momentum and hence ensure that 
implementation of agreed proposals happens in practice. 
Among the tools used by Bosnia’s Bulldozer in this regard 
was a brochure which described in simple terms the proposals that ministers had promised to enact and why 
they were valuable to core constituents. As a means of creating public pressure to ensure that promises were 
followed through, the brochure personally identified and printed photographs of the ministers responsible for 
enacting each specific agreement.  
 
2.5 – The Role of Donors 
 
Donors can help by providing funds and technical advice, putting practitioners in touch with similar initiatives in 
other countries, and disseminating knowledge about international best practice. They can play a key role in 
bringing credibility that legitimizes a competitiveness partnership, and can facilitate access to leading players in 
the public and private sector. But much depends on how the donor is viewed by stakeholders in the country: if 
the business community and general public view donors as part of their country’s problem, high-profile 
involvement can have a negative impact on legitimacy. 
 
2.5.1 – Perceptions of donors 
 
Sometimes only the prodding of a donor will motivate a government to enter into a competitiveness partnership, 
but high-profile engagement by an unpopular donor may create resentment on the government’s part and 
cynicism from business and the public, hindering the partnership’s effectiveness. The history of competitiveness 
partnerships in Ghana during the Rawlings administration provides a case study in the difficulty of treading this 
fine line. World Bank pressure and conditionality was crucial in getting the government involved in consultation, 
but the government did not develop genuine ownership of the recommendations that consultation produced; 
referring to one attempt at partnership, “many business owners [formed] the impression that the government 
represented, at best, a reluctant participant, going along only to please its most influential donor. As a result, 
                                                 
81Institutional Strategy for the Uganda National Forum – USAID, September 1997, p16 
82 Regional Private Sector Forum Issues Paper – International Finance Corporation and Municipal Government of Makassar, June 2003 
83Public/Private Consultation Partnerships – Mark Dorfman and Agata E Pawlowska, World Bank 
“It took me at least six months to build trust 
amongst the private sector when I arrived! 
Some of them would not invite me to meetings 
that were designed to discuss the proposed 
Working Group agendas. The best way to 
mitigate this has been to work hard, work with 
all parties, listen and be transparent. I also 
believe that being contactable and responsive 
is important.” 
James Brew, IFC, on the Cambodian 
Private Sector Forum Page 24 of 55 
there was little confidence among private sector participants that the 




Similarly, the credibility of the 1997 National Dialogue in  Bolivia 
among civil society organizations suffered because it was “widely 
perceived as simply an attempt to please international donors”.
85 This 
hampered the credibility of subsequent efforts of the Bolivian 
government to engage the population in dialogue, especially because 
assurances that consultation would be ongoing after the initial burst of 
energy in 1997 had not been followed through; the follow-up to the 




By contrast, in  Bosnia  the involvement of the Office of the High 
Representative with the backing of four donors was critical in building 
credibility because the international donor community enjoyed more 
popular confidence than national institutions. As this is largely a matter 
of public perceptions of international donors, which varies according to 
country context, the wisest course of action will differ in each situation. 
Possible solutions to donor unpopularity are to de-emphasize the 
donor’s involvement as much as possible and encourage speedy 
moves to a self-supporting partnership. 
 
2.5.2 – Need to transfer ownership  
 
While competitiveness partnerships often need initial 
donor funding to become established, there should be a 
clear aim for funding to become sustainable, which 
means that eventually responsibility should be taken by 
one or more of the members such as  associations, 
governments, chamber of commerce or sometime single 
entrepreneurs. Transferring the responsibility for funding 
to participants is important to ensure that the members of 
the competitiveness partnership develop a sense of 
ownership. The  Cambodian Coordinating Bureau, for 
instance, was set up with IFC and AusAID support, but 
with the clear intention that the Government and the 
private sector should become able to sustain it in the 
medium term without donor support.
87  
 
A sense o f local ownership can also be promoted through use of language. While the promise of financial 
assistance is sometime initially necessary to motivate NGOs to take part in a competitiveness partnership, 
emphasis should move as quickly as possible away from contractual obligations and towards promoting the idea 
of engagement for its own rewards, replacing terms like “ToRs” with terms like “personal commitment”. 
 
2.5.3 – Setting the Agenda 
 
Donors must decide the extent to which they want to retain control of specific policy proposals.  Uganda’s 
experience exemplifies a contrast in styles: with the National Forum, USAID provided funding and advisory 
services but left the recommendations up to members; with the Private Sector Development Program, the final 
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“A clear transition path to full domestic 
ownership is necessary. Businesses should 
also be included in international community 
economic reform programs in other fields, in 
order to (i) increase quality and legitimacy of 
these programs, (ii) improve implementation 
and (iii) break down barriers in communication 
between the international community and 
businesses.”  
Richard Ots, Office of the High 
Representative, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The logo for Phase III of Bosnia’s 
Bulldozer Initiative adopts the 
national colors, and the slogan 
“Minding Our Own Business”  
makes the local ownership clear. Page 25 of 55 
decisions were made by the sponsor, the UNDP.
88 A report for DFID notes that donors can become “one of the 
biggest obstacles” to dialogue when they impose their agenda and “make both governments and private sector 
associations respond more to donor priorities than to their home constituencies”.
89 
 
While donors often have valuable technical expertise to exercise a quality control function on proposals for 
reform  – proposals from the Bulldozer in  Bosnia were submitted to government only  when they had the 
international community’s seal of approval – they must decide whether reforms will fail such quality control only 
when they are technically ill-advised or also when they contradict a donor’s policies. One of the second-phase 
reforms agreed on by the Bosnia Bulldozer Initiative was an export ban on raw logs pending the establishment 
of a new forestry certification system that would protect the local industry and ecosystem. The World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund opposed the export ban but they did not have veto power and the Bulldozer 
committee pressed on with the recommendation. 
 
The regulations associated with donor funding can cause a lack of responsiveness to local needs and changing 
situations, a risk which DFID has tackled successfully by setting up independent trusts and “challenge funds” 
such as the Business Linkages Challenge Fund in Tanzania, which can provide research and analysis services 




Donors must also be alert to the risk that their involvement can cause a narrowing of focus and the consequent 
favoring of some stakeholders’ interests at the expense of others’. A review of USAID assistance to consultation 
mechanisms in Ghana and Uganda raised this point: because support came from USAID’s Economic Growth 
program rather than the Democracy and Governance program, “ labor unions have received only  minor 
assistance and attention. While appropriate to the goals of EG programs at least in the short term, this 
imbalance may shortchange potential long-term gains in terms not only of participation and democracy, but also 
in terms of economic stability and/or longer-term economic growth.”
91 
 
2.6 – Communication Strategy 
 
The use of a branding strategy involving a clear logo and concise, straightforward mission statement, together 
with and a policy of active outreach towards the local entrepreneur community and openness with the media, 
can be critical elements in helping a competitiveness partnership to establish the credibility and legitimacy it 
needs to achieve results. This section considers the need for communications and two essential aspects of an 
outreach strategy: the use of branding and social marketing.  
 
2.6.1 – The need for communications 
 
A review of the competitiveness partnerships in which DFID has been involved concludes that the more 
successful initiatives “have effective communications strategies for letting not only all participants, but also the 
general public know the returns on the time and effort invested in dialogue.” One reason for this greater success 
is that a communications strategy helps to tackle a common “failure among many smaller private sector actors to 
see the wider picture, and to understand how dialogue can benefit their businesses”.
92 
 
The Investor Councils in Africa demonstrate the need for active outreach, as the failure to communicate 
adequately the Councils’ aims has left local businesses feeling neglected and uninvolved: “In all the countries, 
the local private sector generally does not have a clear idea of the Council… Most wanted more transparency in 
terms of the membership and work of the Councils.”
93 It is recommended that “[a]ll the Councils need to develop 
a statement of mission and objectives that members can commit to.”
94 
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“The Bulldozer initiative is a mechanism to 
bulldoze away the roadblocks to a good 
business climate. It has two goals: 
1.  Improve business climate by enacting 
much-needed reforms 
2.  Organize the business community into 
an active lobby for reform” 
Bosnia, Bulldozer Initiative
 
“The objectives of the Vietnam Business Forum are as follows: 
1.  To represent the views of the private sector in Vietnam, using the 
broadest possible participation of the private sector on a volunteer 
basis. 
2.  To assist the Vietnamese government to develop its private sector. 
3.  To engage in a regular, constructive dialogue with the Vietnamese 
Government in order to make constructive contributions to policies 
& regulations that underpin the economic development of the 
country. 
4.  To work on issues of detail through sector-specific sub-groups. 
5.  To identify areas of difficulty for the private sector, particularly in the 
implementation of laws and regulations, where donor support and 
funding may provide or help provide a solution.” 
Vietnam Business Forum
 
2.6.2 – Branding 
 
Competitiveness partnerships should convey their aims clearly and simply, as with the logos and mission 
statements illustrated below as examples
95. Rebranding Nigeria’s “Competitiveness Forum Working Group” as 
the “Better Business Initiative” helped to communicate its core values to its target audience. Brand names are 
only as good as the values associated with them, and the way values are communicated depends on the target 
audience that a brand name is trying to capture. Key questions for members of a competitiveness partnership to 
answer are: who is your audience, and what are the values you want to communicate? The name will derive 
from the answers. Some factors to consider: 
 
 
•  The word “business” conveys an element of 
private sector advocacy. 
•  The words “partnership” or “forum” convey 
an element of even-handed dialogue. 
•  The name of the country or region stresses 
geographical identity and common cause. 
•  The word “voice” suggests private sector 
frustration. 
•  The word “Bulldozer” conveys private sector 
impatience. 
•  The word “initiative” evokes private sector 
leadership in policy making. 
•  The word “micro” could imply a focus on 
SME issues. 
•  The words “competitiveness” or “investment 
climate” suggest a more macro focus. 
•  The word “better” creates the impression of 
optimism and goodwill 
 
As well as a suitably evocative name, a logo can be a useful tool for communication. The logo can be formed of 
the name’s initials, or a simple drawing which conveys a sense of what the partnership is all about. The logo 
should be visible on all reports, stationery, press releases, press conferences and so forth; in  Bosnia, the 
Bulldozer image quickly became associated with the notion of speedy progress to help business. 
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Bulldozer Initiative 
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2.6.3 – Social Marketing 
 
Social marketing is the name given to attempts to bring about social change by using the techniques of 
commercial marketing. Campaigns may be aimed directly at the people whose behavior it is intended to change 
– for example, smokers. Another strategy is to aim campaigns at decision-makers who have the ability to create 
circumstances in which that behavior change is more likely – for example, employers who can decide to ban 
smoking in the workplace. Going further upstream, social marketing can also be highly effective in changing 
behavior by influencing people who can bring effective pressure to bear on those decision-makers  – for 
example, employees who can lobby employers for workplace smoking bans. 
 
In the context of competitiveness partnerships, it offers techniques to engage and enthuse businesspeople in 
advocating for reform, and to make government decision-makers more open to change. The four “stages of 
change” in social marketing are pre-contemplation – that is, lack of any belief that action could be worthwhile – 
contemplation, preparation and action
96. Bosnia’s Bulldozer used outreach techniques including a traveling road 
show to move businesspeople from the skeptical stage of pre-contemplation towards active involvement in 
pressing for reform. 
 
It did so by paying attention to the “BCOS” factors of 
Social Marketing  – benefits, costs, others and self-
efficacy
97. Bulldozer presentations made clear what 
the benefits to individual businesspeople would be, 
through devices such as a simple graphic depicting a 
bulldozer ploughing a direct path through a maze. It 
minimized the costs, in terms of time commitment, by 
holding meetings as infrequently as possible and on a 
regional basis, and setting a short time scale for 
action. It emphasized the involvement of others, 
especially the value of networking with the donor 
community and with other local entrepreneurs. And it 
eased qualms about self-efficacy by having an efficient 
secretariat and enabling suggestions for reforms to be 
submitted speedily on a simple, four-question form
98. A 
similar approach was taken while designing the 
Kosovo advocacy initiative. 
 
The value of outreach activities is also demonstrated by other competitiveness partnerships
99. The agriculture 
working group of Cambodia’s Private Sector Forum conducted a nationwide survey of farmers – most of whom 
are poor, small-scale, rural and highly engaged in the informal sector – to discover the key issues. In the Cook 
Islands, the Asian Development Bank-led Economic Reform Program helped the government to develop “good 
public consultation mechanisms to gauge feedback and support for new projects. This usually entails substantial 
public and media campaigns, village seminars and private consultations”.
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An image used to convey the benefits 
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PART THREE: Challenges and Strategies 
 
 
A review of the literature reveals that competitiveness partnerships in diverse political settings often face the 
same kind of challenges. The aim of Part Three aims is to identify these common challenges and consider 
strategies to tackle them. The intention of raising these risk factors is not to suggest that competitiveness 
partnerships are dangerous, but rather to show how awareness of the risks and careful planning can help 
participants to succeed. 
 
3.1 – CHALLENGE: Reinforcing vested interests 
 
THE CHALLENGE: Promoting personal contact between government and businesspeople may give too 
much influence to a small and unrepresentative group, create opportunities for rent-seeking and 
cronyism, or otherwise reinforce the power of existing elites. 
 
Competitiveness partnerships create both an 
opportunity and a risk when other lines of 
communication between government and society are 
weak. Done well, competitiveness partnerships can 
enable the voices of stakeholders to be heard by a 
government that is relatively undemocratic in its 
functioning, and can give governments input  which 
will improve the quality of their policy-making. Done 
badly, however, competitiveness partnerships can 
give unhealthy influence to an unrepresentative 
group of stakeholders, reinforce links between 
politicians and lobbyists and provide a veneer of 
legitimacy for bad policies. 
 
A World Bank Private Sector Development Department Occasional Paper notes that some critics believe 
“regular interactions, information sharing and trust generation among government officials and business persons 
in East Asia is  worrisome” as it creates opportunity to conspire against the public good.
101 This does not 
necessarily imply behind-closed-doors deal-making, although that can happen; it may merely be that 
participation in a consultative dialogue may provide a business with various advantages such as early 
knowledge of impending policy shifts and first-name familiarity with influential government officials, which provide 
an unfair competitive edge against business competitors who are not network members.
102 
 
Cameroon provides an example of a competitiveness partnership diverted into rent-seeking activity. Most of the 
private sector members of the Competitiveness Committee, created in 1998, were members of one business 
lobbying association and tried “to use the committee to defend their rent seeking situation”.
103 The World Bank, 
which had given financial support to the committee, had to insist on its restructuring. In  Mongolia, USAID 
decided against creating a public-private consultative mechanism because it feared the relatively narrow range 
of potential participants would mean influence would become unhealthily concentrated.
104 
 
3.1.1 – STRATEGY: Be open and transparent 
 
An explicit commitment to transparency, and the incorporation into the partnership of monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms, are essential safeguards against the risk of cronyism and institutional capture. 
Another  way of tackling cronyism is to  ensure that no topics are off-limits for discussion. In  Malaysia, the 
government insisted on keeping off the table sensitive subjects such as privatization and Malay ethnic 
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3.1.2 – STRATEGY: Create a broad base 
 
Involving intermediaries such as business membership associations and chambers of commerce (when they are 
relatively unbound from vested interests), has the clear potential to help reduce the risk of capture, relative to 
group that contains representatives of only a few individual businesses. Having a large number of working 
committees with broad representation can also help to head off the chance of institutional capture at the top by 
ensuring that participation is broad-based at lower levels. This strategy has seen success in Uganda.
106  
 
Shortcomings of dialogue mechanisms which are too concentrated at the top are most resented by the base of 
good-willing entrepreneurs, who may then decide to take charge – or else part with the partnership. In Mexico, 
at the end of the 1990’s, the importance of political allegiance to the main party created tensions between the 
mass of entrepreneurs and the institutions supposed to represent them. It provided an opportunity for new 
entrants, namely non-aligned chambers of commerce and business associations, to launch initiatives that quickly 
reached a broad advocacy support, especially at the regional and state level.  
 
An open question is whether participants should speak as individuals rather than as representatives of their 
organizations. This seemed to promote openness in Uganda, but in other cases – especially in post-conflict 
situations – individuals can be stronger than the institutions they belong to; in such circumstances, speaking for 
organizations can reduce the importance of controversial and powerful personalities. In Bosnia, for instance, 
when the Bulldozer Initiative expanded to encompass trades unions in the dialogue, it was felt that involving 
local-level officials who would speak on behalf of their union and were relatively unknown to the public would 
lead to less risk of capture by the union movement than if the dialogue were to involve the national leader, a 
high-profile figure who polarized popular opinion. 
 
3.2 – CHALLENGE: Big businesses domination excludes SMEs 
 
THE CHALLENGE: Competitiveness partnerships may give big businesses a more powerful voice than 
small and medium-sized enterprises, skewing reform recommendations in their favor. 
 
There are obvious reasons why it is easier to engage with 
representatives of a small number of large organizations than with 
a large number of small organizations – it is simpler to organize, 
and members are more likely to speak with a unified voice. Given 
the difficulty of establishing dialogue between government and the 
private sector, the path of least resistance is often for government 
to focus on consulting a relatively small number of relatively large 
firms, especially when it comes to promote foreign direct 
investment. This understandable dynamic is based on the larger 
growth potential of larger firms, but it has often led to the interests 
of SMEs being under-represented in competitiveness 
partnerships, while SME entrepreneurs are often the larger source 
of employment in emerging markets. 
 
This happens even when the problem is well understood. A study 
by the World Bank in 2001 recommended that domestic firms 
should be given equal priority, but when the Bank came to set up Investor Councils in Africa it instead adopted a 
model of one-third local firms, one-third multinational corporations with investments in the country, and one-third 
multinational corporations without investments in the country; but it recognized that inviting mostly big and 
foreign countries would mean the Councils were “naturally biased towards considering the problems of larger 
companies, while possibly de-emphasizing e.g. market entry, competition and finance aspects”.
107 The result has 
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been that local entrepreneurs feel excluded: in Ghana, “[t]heir perception of GIAC is one of suspicion and some 
fear. The MNCs which dominate the GIAC are seen as enclaves by themselves with few linkages to local 
business and to local society”.
108 
 
A further risk for SMEs is that business associations which exist to represent their interests may in practice listen 
more to their larger members. In Botswana, SMEs have felt disengaged from dialogue because their trade 
organization, BOCCIM, listens more to the concerns of bigger businesses.
109 This was also the case with the 
Business Coordinating Council, which represented business concerns in consultations about  Mexico’s 
negotiating stance for NAFTA. As a result, the opinions which the Mexican government heard from business 
“magnified the interests of large financial-industrial groups that were in a reasonably good position to absorb the 
costs of economic liberalization”.
110 
 
A study in Vietnam found that large businesses are more likely than small businesses to be members of an 
association. Moreover, large businesses were more likely to cite a desire to be represented in dialogue with 
government as one of their main reasons for joining an association; “smaller, poorer and more remotely located 
businesses cited this reason much less often because they are less likely to have the size, strength and ability to 
engage in the dialogue.”
111 Similarly, the Bulgarian Competitiveness Initiative notes that industry associations in 




3.2.1 STRATEGY: Strengthen business associations 
 
Strong business associations which genuinely speak for SMEs can be extremely helpful in making sure that the 
concerns of SMEs are heard in dialogue. One solution to ensuring SME representation might appear to be for 
governments to make it compulsory for entrepreneurs to join business member organizations, but experience 
suggests this rarely works in practice, especially in emerging markets: compulsory membership tends to make 
members resentful and disengaged, undermining the organization’s legitimacy. Also, compulsory membership 
creates a temptation for governments to seek to control an association’s activities; in Mexico, the ruling party’s 
history of influencing the elections for leadership of the country’s compulsory business chambers led to the 
elected leaders being “commonly viewed to be concerned as much with transmitting government positions to 
their members as with articulating member concerns to the government”.
113 In Bosnia, one of the most popular 
reforms of the Bulldozer Initiative was the abolition of compulsory fees for belonging to a Chamber of Commerce 
– not least because the vibrancy of the Bulldozer Initiative relative to the Chambers of Commerce had made 
entrepreneurs feel that they received little of value for their compulsory fees. 
 
A good compromise may be the  Japanese approach of retaining voluntary membership, but with the state 
providing incentives to join such as loan guarantees, special financing and procurement opportunities; around 
95% of Japanese small businesses are members of an officially sanctioned business association. Another way 
forward is shown by Samoa, where “[t]he Government currently provides annual grants to assist in meeting the 
costs of operating the secretariats of the Chamber of Commerce and the Manufacturers Association. In addition 
to the grants, the Government has also supported donor funding for developing corporate strategies for both the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Manufacturers Association.”
114 
 
The authors of the Vietnam study conclude that governments can help by including associations in dialogue, 
creating an enabling regulatory framework in which they can operate, and delegating some tasks of SME 
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The “Roadblock Submission Form” 
contained four simple questions for 
entrepreneurs to describe difficulties 
they face and propose a solution. 
3.2.2 STRATEGY: Reach out to every entrepreneur equally 
 
An alternative or complementary strategy to strengthening 
business associations is to actively pursue outreach programs 
which bypass such associations and seek input directly from 
individual businesspeople. This can take the form of 
roadshows and meetings at which entrepreneurs are invited to 
fill in forms detailing suggestions for reform, as the Bulldozer 
initiative did in  Bosnia. Or it can take the form of a donor 
surveying a nd meeting with small entrepreneurs in order to 
better understand their concerns and be able to build them into 
the focus that a new competitiveness partnership will have, as 
Cambodia’s PSF did with small-scale rural farmers and as the 
World Bank is now doing in regions of Indonesia. 
 
The advantage of direct outreach is that every entrepreneur 
has an equal opportunity to put forward reforms. 80% of the 
Bulldozer’s proposals came from small businesses, confirming 
the existence of grassroots energy and ideas which existing 
associations had failed to harness. A report prepared for the 
USAID mission to Kosovo recommended that the proposed 
new competitiveness partnership use the same method of 
collecting suggested reforms through a simple form that any 
businessperson can submit. The report emphasizes the 
importance of prompt responses to submitted forms: “ While 
this process may require more effort from the Working Groups 
and Admin Support, responses will help people feel more 
inclined to be active at the grassroots level. Also, responses 
will help build credibility.”
116 
 
3.3 – CHALLENGE: The Talk Shop 
 
THE CHALLENGE: Competitiveness partnerships may become ineffective after a promising start, 
descending into a talk shop from which little substantive action results. Participants may become 
disillusioned with wasting time and energy, with negative effects on the credibility of public policy. 
 
“Talk shop” is a common phrase in case studies of public-
private collaboration. It is not an easy problem to eradicate, as 
evidenced by two examples from Ghana a decade apart. In the 
early 1990s, “lack of defined boundaries or guidelines for 
discussion caused [Private Sector Roundtable] meetings to 
wander among a wide  range of disconnected topics.”
117 
Though progress has since been made, a report on the initial 
experience of the Ghana Investment Advisory Council used 
almost identical language: “Unable to achieve consensus on a 
short list of priority issues, the members opted instead to 
identify 18 sets of issues (including “the reform of many laws”) 
as targeted action points... meetings seemed to lack focus, 
covering too many topics in an open discussion forum”.
118  
 
The failure of the Private Sector Roundtable was largely 
attributable to this problem: “Discussions seemed to go on 
without any particular direction, and attendance at PSR 
meetings declined, as a number of members became tired of 
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attending meetings that did not produce concrete results.”
119 In  Uganda, the National Forum suffered from 
waning enthusiasm after a productive start. One member commented that “Some issues get bogged down in 
endless debate”, while another was quoted as saying "I am so fed up.  I want to give up.  No matter what you 
write, no one seems to read it anymore.”
120  
 
3.3.1 – STRATEGY: Revisit the structure  
 
The National Forum in Uganda attempted to tackle the “talk shop” perception by revisiting the membership of 
the working group committees, carefully selecting participants who would provide a better balance of outlooks 
and skills. “The Monitoring Committee found that the working groups also needed more parliamentarians to 
complement the government and private sector representatives with the political savvy of these law-makers. 
Thus, the National Forum partnership of two became a triad. It recruited people who were good in managing 
others and focusing others on getting things done”.
121 USAID recommended other means to counter frustration 
at the Forum’s inactivity, including incrementalizing large reforms so that concrete successes could be seen 
more quickly, and constantly assessing whether specific working groups have outlived their usefulness and new 
ones need to be formed.
122 
 
3.3.2 – STRATEGY: Clear agendas with concrete proposals 
 
Meetings are less likely to degenerate into talk shops when the agenda is strict and clear and communicated 
well in advance, and when there are concrete proposals on the agenda that require decisions. Such careful 
planning and attention to the detail of agendas and the importance of focusing on narrowly-defined outputs has 
been an important part of the success of the Vietnam Business Forum in maintaining focus and momentum, and 
preventing discussions from drifting. A useful component of this strategy can be to pursue a two-tier approach. 
Setting aside part of an annual meeting for participants to get complaints off their chests can help them to stay 
focused during more regular meetings of working groups. In Bosnia, each plenary session of the Bulldozer 
Committee aimed at voting on a number of proposals that had been distributed in advance to the participants in 
a clear and standardized format. The voting took place only after all the proposals were discussed, which helped 
sustain focus and momentum throughout the five hours long sessions 
 
3.3.3 – STRATEGY: Manage expectations 
 
An experienced and resourceful organizer can head off the risk of meetings being diverted onto tangents by 
managing expectations in private conversations beforehand, as happened with good effect on numerous 
occasions with the Bosnia Bulldozer Initiative. One possibility is to play what has been called the “divorced 
parents” strategy, intimating privately to each of two parties who are in a state of potential conflict that the other 
is prepared to take a conciliatory stance. Another is to discuss with participants in advance when a disruptive 
contribution is expected and seek a general agreement to move on swiftly, heading off the chance of a reaction 
which would then lead to a time-consuming detour from the agenda.  
 
It is important for the leaders of the partnership, and especially if donors are very involved, not to allow 
expectations to be raised which will cause disappointment by not being fulfilled. In Balikpanan, Indonesia, when a 
team from the World Bank visited to discuss the founding of a competitiveness partnership, it found instead a 
widespread expectation of financial help.
123 In discussing Africa’s Investor Councils, a report notes that “care needs 
to be taken to not over estimate and not over promise what the Council can achieve, as bitter cynicism is second 
nature here for many.” In Mali in particular, “[w]ith the very public launch of the PIAC in September 2004, with 
extensive press and TV coverage, some members of the government and the private sector expressed concern 
over the inevitability of disappointment of the public as council results cannot match the simplistic expectations of 
quick and substantial change and investment growth in the country.”
124 
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3.3.4 – STRATEGY: Make participants accountable to press and peers 
 
The Bosnia Bulldozer Initiative also exemplifies the usefulness of public relations in maintaining enthusiasm and 
getting results. Part of this effect comes from communicating the benefits of participation to businesspeople, 
reminding them of why it is worthwhile putting in the effort. But another important element of the media strategy – 
one which has also been used in Nigeria’s Better Business Initiative – is to use public declarations of intent as a 
means of creating expectations, which then creates pressure to achieve concrete results. 
 
Using working groups as a filter process for proposals can also be used as a means of creating pressure for 
plenary meetings to be oriented on results. If a working group has, say, twenty possible proposals to consider 
but a limit of three that it can put to the plenary session, this creates substantial peer pressure on the head of the 
working group to get the three which are chosen approved. 
 
3.3.5 – STRATEGY: Live and let die 
 
It may be unproductive to throw energy into seeking to prolong the 
active life of a specific partnership mechanism which achieved initial 
successes but seems to be losing momentum. Often consultative 
mechanisms accompany a specific reform agenda, and as a 
consequence have limited lifetimes; the important thing is the 
principle of partnership, not the specifics of a particular mechanism 
of interaction. Successful but short-lived initiatives which are 
allowed to die a natural death can gain an iconic value, enabling 
businesses and government officials to look back on them with 
pride and as a positive reference point to be cited as an example.  
 
When planning a competitiveness partnership, founders should give 
thought to how it might ultimately be dismantled. As discussed in 
2.1, initiatives often arise to fill an institutional vacuum – but by 
aligning the structure of the initiative with existing but dormant or underperforming institutions, founders can 
increase the chance of positively diffusing the energy that remains when the initiative has run its natural course. 
This has happened with some success in  Bosnia, where some of the energy generated by the Bulldozer 
Initiative has revitalized the Social and Economic Council and some of the forward momentum from the regional 
working groups has also given a boost to Regional Development Associations. In Suriname, the World Bank’s 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service sponsored in 2005 a narrowly focused public-private dialogue organized to 
find a compromise between the Ministry of Finance and the private sector on amending the Law on Investment. 
Once the initiative reached its goal of presenting a new legislation to parliament, it was dismantled. But the 
process, through which three leading business associations worked hand in hand for the first time, led to the 
revival of the Suriname Business Forum. The Forum had been created a few years earlier, but had never 
seemed to gain its own momentum and had therefore remained basically an institutional empty shell, until it 
benefited from the termination of the public-private dialogue initiative on the Law on Investment.
125  
 
3.4 – CHALLENGE: The one-man band 
 
THE CHALLENGE: Competitiveness partnerships may rest too heavily on the personal involvement of a 
senior government figure or adviser, with the result that when that person loses influence or interest or 
office, the partnership fails. 
 
It is inevitable that competitiveness partnerships will rely to some degree on the enthusiasm and commitment of 
key individuals, and the personal involvement of top-level government figures is one of the determining features 
of success. But building the partnership too closely around individuals constitutes a significant risk. The personal 
involvement of a country’s leader has been crucial in the relative success of the World Bank-initiated Investor 
Councils in several African countries – the activity of Senegal’s president in chairing Council meetings and 
holding press conferences was seen as a major reason why more early progress was achieved there than in 
Ghana, where the President initially delegated the chair to another minister. 
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In Botswana, the effectiveness of sub-committees of the High-Level Consultative Committee are seen to vary 
widely from ministry to ministry, depending on the personalities involved – some ministers are enthusiastic, while 
others regard it as an irksome duty.
126 In Malaysia, the effectiveness of committees is “primarily a function of 
who was the head”.
127 In Uganda, the president’s personal backing was critical to getting reforms proposed by 
the National Forum implemented – when his interest waned, so did results.
128  
 
3.4.1 – STRATEGY: Generate support from the bottom-up 
 
While it may take the involvement of a key individual to get a competitiveness partnership started, the 
partnership can seek to develop a groundswell of goodwill to support it in case the enthusiasm or influence of 
that key individual wanes. The support of High Representative Paddy Ashdown was key to getting the Bulldozer 
established in Bosnia, but its strategy of generating popular enthusiasm quickly enabled it to press ahead using 
its own momentum.  
 
While personal commitment from senior government figures is a necessary condition of progress, outreach 
efforts that cause the public to look favorably on competitiveness partnerships can give individual politicians an 
incentive to be more enthusiastic and can hence minimize the effects of a change in government personnel. 
 
3.4.2 – STRATEGY: Foster realistic expectations 
 
Part of the problem with competitiveness partnerships losing steam when an individual becomes less involved 
can consist of unrealistic expectations initially raised by that individual’s involvement. With the active support of 
High Representative Paddy Ashdown, phase one of Bosnia’s Bulldozer Initiative successfully passed all 50 of its 
proposed reforms. When Ashdown inevitably took more of a back seat during phase two, the success rate 
reduced to 30 out of 50 reforms getting implemented. Many of the participants consequently became 
discouraged, though this relatively disappointing tally would nonetheless be considered a remarkable strike rate 
by most seasoned lobbyists. In retrospect, more of an effort should have been made to educate participants in 
the frustration and failures likely to be involved in dialogue when the effect of the initial high-profile individual 
political support had worn off. 
 
3.5 – CHALLENGE: Playing politics 
 
THE CHALLENGE: Competitiveness partnerships may become too closely aligned with political factions, 
risking either a failure to persist across a change of administration or alienating the government by 
championing reforms which are closely identified with opposition groups. 
 
When leading businesspeople are also leading figures in opposition political parties, governments may either be 
suspicious of engagement in a competitiveness partnership or keen to sideline opposition figures, which means 
the partnership will not have the credibility needed to persist across changes of administration. In the context of 
a Nigerian consultation mechanism, UNIDO commented on the dangers of partnerships “put in place by the 
current political leadership with very little involvement of all political groups. For sustainability, it is important that 
all political groups are committed to the process and that the processes have a legal framework”.
129 
 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the National Dialogue in Bolivia has been hampered by the skepticism with which 
it is viewed by opposition political groups. ““A number of politicians were said to be aggrieved about the 
Dialogue, which they viewed as a judgement of the international community that democracy is not working, and 
one commentator noted that although the opposition participated, they did not “believe” in it.”
130 
 
Political tensions may come to undermine even an established competitiveness partnership. The Private 
Enterprise Foundation had enjoyed considerable success in Ghana when it announced a “summit” to discuss 
economic policy reform; embarrassed by the implication that it had lost control of the dialogue, the government 
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responded by downgrading the “summit” to a “forum” and handing organizational responsibility to another group. 
A large part of the problem was felt to be that the “PEF's broadly representative membership roster necessarily 
came to include some businesses that were openly aligned with opposition leaders or organizations”.
131 
 
3.5.1 – STRATEGY: Use outreach to de-politicise 
 
While care should be taken when setting up competitiveness partnerships to aim for a membership which is 
broadly representative and not overly identified with any political group, in practice this can be difficult to 
achieve. An effective outreach program can help to de-politicize the process by emphasizing the practical 
benefits to real people: if public opinion becomes generally supportive of the competitiveness partnership and 
sees it as genuinely aiming to advance the interests of society at large, politicians of all persuasions are less 
likely to seek to obstruct dialogue or allow it to lapse when power changes hands. 
 
Presentational skills are key as battles must be chosen carefully – it makes sense to concentrate on explaining 
reforms that can be framed simply so that everyone can understand. Ways must be found to humanize the 
reforms so that everyday people can relate to the benefits they are bringing. In Bosnia, every day for three 
months a newspaper published a column featuring a photograph of an entrepreneur and answers to a standard 
set of questions about how his or her business would benefit from a Bulldozer reform; this alone did much to 
further public understanding and support.  
 
3.5.2 – STRATEGY: Woo parliamentarians and local politicians 
 
Direct outreach to parliamentarians and local politicians can help to defuse political tensions. In Bosnia, the 
Bulldozer Committee organized meetings with parliamentary working groups at which every Bulldozer working 
committee head was present. The parliamentarians were not only pleased to receive such comprehensive 
personal attention, they were able to understand that the initiative involved real people who were influential 
constituents of theirs, and was not just composed of international agencies and the executive branch. 
 
3.6 – CHALLENGE: Undermining others 
 
THE CHALLENGE: New mechanisms for consultation may duplicate the work of existing mechanisms, 
causing confusion and overburdening participants. 
 
Some competitiveness partnerships may become victims of their own success. In Uganda, the initial success of 
the National Forum led to the creation of similar organizations which duplicated the work and diluted the 
effectiveness of the original by overburdening individuals and confusing lines of communication: “Everyone had 




If competitiveness partnerships are set up as initiatives, separate from any existing institution, it can be hard for 
them to avoid competing with institutions. Indeed, one of the reasons a new competitiveness partnership may be 
needed is that existing institutions are failing to fulfill their role. Sometimes this can work out well: the Bulldozer 
Initiative capitalized on the vacuum created by the moribund Social and Economic Council in  Bosnia, and 
ultimately came to be institutionalized as part of a revitalized Social and Economic Council; viewed from an 
institutional point of view, Bulldozer merely bridged a gap in the active life of an existing institution. But it is 
always necessary to give careful though to whether a competitiveness partnership will be encroaching on ground 
which is already adequately covered elsewhere. 
 
3.6.1 – STRATEGY: Bring existing institutions on board 
 
Transparency of process and inclusion of all relevant parties are the key factors in avoiding exclusion of existing 
institutions and interests. The World Bank’s Investor Councils in Africa seek to follow this approach: “[t]here was 
great resistance to the idea of creating new consultative structures, unless the existing structures were deemed 
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unsalvageable.”
133 The Tanzanian Investors Round Table, for instance, has its secretariat run by the Tanzania 
National Business Council (TNBC), established in 2001 as a public-private forum of the Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation (TPSF). The World Bank also brought existing institutions on board when setting up investor councils 
in Uganda (the Ugandan Investment Authority) and Senegal (APIX). 
 
3.6.2 – STRATEGY: Include ministerial technical staff 
 
One of the commonest risks of duplication occurs when a competitiveness partnership is located in the 
president’s office and ministries are excluded from working groups that are covering their turf, creating alienation 
and resentment among the politicians and civil servants who will ultimately be responsible for implementing any 
reform proposals. This became a problem in Bosnia where the creation of an Emergency Reform Unit in the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet office was seen by some as unnecessarily duplicating the work of ministries. A solution 
is to take a two-step approach of securing the responsible minister’s initial agreement for the broad thrust of the 
reform effort, and then including lower-level technical staff from the ministry in conducting research and drawing 
up proposals. When a ministry’s technical staff is involved in putting together the proposals for reform, they are 
likely to enjoy a smoother passage within the ministry; an example is the smooth and efficient passing of a 
package of tax reforms as part of the Bulldozer Initiative.  
                                                 





If managed well, competitiveness partnerships can be of crucial importance to the investment climate reform 
process.  
 
The range of benefits they can bring about, either in “hard” results (such as proposal and implementation of 
policy reforms, better implementation or better macro performance) or in “soft” ones (such as building trust, 
transforming lobbying into advocacy, fostering better governance, improving regulatory impact assessment 
practices in government or building bridges within the civic society) is unmatched.  
 
The authors have reviewed a checklist of issues for private sector advocates, public authorities and development 
practitioners to consider, as a resource. The variety of choice may seem overwhelming. But there is no “one-
size-fits-all” type of public-private dialogue mechanism. For that reason, investing time, resources and attention 
to designing a mechanism which would best fit a particular situation is crucial. At a time where trade liberalization 
has brought a renewed pressure for countries to dramatically improve their competitiveness, governments are 
compelled to work even closer with  the private sector. When public authorities, entrepreneurs  - and 
subsequently, donors - fine-tune their engagement with each other through credible public private dialogues, 
their coordinated actions can ensure a stronger impact of policies on investment, employment and growth.  
 
Competitiveness partnerships need to be nurtured over the long term. As an umbrella process and a focused 
outlet for engagement of all relevant actors, definition of reform priorities, consensus building and filtering, 
proposition, implementation and monitoring of PSD reforms, launching them adequately is not close to being 
sufficient. Maintaining the momentum, periodically reviewing processes and results, and efficiently addressing 
the risks involved with maintaining a lively and productive dialogue are crucial issues. In that regard, the quick 
look this study took at how partnerships have performed over time in many countries is revealing. Many 
partnerships have been transformed into ineffective talk shops. Others got entrenched into p olitical mazes. 
Some were well structured, but could not survive the loss of their champion nor a relocation to a different host 
institution. Maybe those partnerships were not meant to live long, and should be judged only on their short-lived 
life. This review has addressed many strategies that could help avoid those risks. Managing expectations, 
structuring the partnership in a way that enables it to be reactive to change and reaching out to a range of 
stakeholders are just a few of the many techniques that were enumerated. If applied with dexterity, the authors 
believe they could enable those involved with public-private dialogues to take the necessary steps to maintain 
the momentum and effectiveness of such structures. 
 
The aim of this study was to disseminate knowledge, good practices and lessons learned on public-private 
dialogues. The authors hope that this endeavor will persuade governments, private sector advocates and the 
donor community to build up more operational capacity and coordinated support for such mechanisms, as 
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Competitiveness partnerships consist of structured dialogue between the government and private sector to 
improve the investment climate. This checklist is provided as a quick way for those involved in the design or 
running of a competitiveness partnership to see how it shapes up against the main factors we have identified. 
The checklist follows the structure of part two of the paper, incorporating also some ideas from part three. 
 
While the checklist addresses issues in detail, the summary table enable practitioners to quickly assess 
partnerships by using a more convenient matrix format. 
 
 
   
Range of issues to identify and tackle while designing or maintaining partnerships 
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– Government willingness 
Are government leaders personally enthusiastic about dialogue?  
 
– Cross-spectrum support 
Have key opposition leaders been persuaded that dialogue is intended to be politically neutral?  
 
– Business priorities 
Are businesses organised into associations which can provide a representative list of areas of concern? Is field 
research needed to determine priority areas? 
 
– Existing organisations 
Can dialogue be established through harnessing existing structures which are moribund or ineffective or 
successful but only in a limited sphere? If a new structure is required to fill a vacuum, does it avoid duplicating or 
undermining the work of existing organizations?  
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– Sense of urgency 
Is there a sense of urgency arising from a commonly-recognized need to solve a pressing problem? Can such a 
sense be generated by focusing public awareness on a commonly-recognized problem? Can it be generated 
through PR, media management, holding a high-profile forum, or imposition of artificial deadlines? 
 
– Establishing credibility 
Is there a need or scope for the government to build trust by making a visible commitment which can be verified 
in a short time? Have respected individuals in the business community been enlisted to act as “champions” 
among their peers? Is the sponsor credible in terms of providing sufficient funds without undermining legitimacy? 
 
2. Organizing participation 
 
– Selection mechanisms 
What is the mechanism for deciding who will be invited to participate? Are there clear and explicit criteria for 
membership which minimize the risk of resentment from those who are excluded? Are there credible safeguards 
against the possibility of privileged access to ministers conferring unfair business advantages? 
 
– Terms of membership 
Will membership be permanent or ad hoc, or a combination such as permanent membership of plenary body 
with ad hoc invitations to join issue-driven working groups? Will members attend as representatives of their 
organizations or as private individuals? Are members required to make commitments, such as organizations 
being represented by the same individuals, or membership lapsing with poor attendance? 
 
– Choosing key individuals 
Are public sector representatives drawn from the highest possible levels of government? Has every effort been 
made to involve companies which enjoy a good reputation for social responsibility? Are individuals involved who 
are widely respected, dynamic, open-minded, unafraid to speak their minds, and who seem likely to be 
motivated as much by public spirit as their own personal financial interests? Are enough women involved? 
 
– Striking a balance 
Is the membership small enough to create a reasonable probability of cohesion and efficiency, while broad 
enough to reduce the risk of institutional capture and to have legitimacy in the eyes of the public? 
 
– Including SMEs 
Are home-grown SMEs adequately represented? Has the partnership made adequate efforts to harness existing 
business member organizations and chambers of commerce? If no strong, credible and representative business 
associations exist, can existing associations be strengthened or new ones formed?  
 
– Civil society 
Has adequate consideration been given to the pros and cons, in terms of logistics versus legitimacy, of involving 
representatives of civil society, such as labor unions, consumer groups, environmental groups, NGOs, 




– Permanent secretariat 
Is there a permanent secretariat – either free-standing or lodged within a participating organization – responsible 
for arranging meetings, distributing agendas and minutes, operating as contact point, etc? Does the secretariat 
have sufficient funding, logistical capacity and experience among its staff experience to establish credibility? 
 
– Individual leadership 
Is the head of the secretariat a dynamic, experienced and well-informed individual who will be able to command 
the trust and respect of all participants? 
 
– Working groups 
Are working groups to be organized by issue, by industry, by region or by some combination of factors? What is 
the mechanism for deciding on the agenda and composition of each working group, and for deciding when 
specific working groups need to be reformed or disbanded and new ones set up? 
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– Government structure 
Has the structure of the partnership been designed to mesh with the government’s decision-making structure? 
Are technical staff from relevant ministries invited to give input? Has sufficient consideration been given to 
establishing dialogue with decision-making entities at local, regional and cross-national levels? 
 
– Setting the tone 
Is there an explicit commitment to supporting transparency, openness and the ability to speak freely? Is there a 
commitment to no items being off-limits for discussion? 
 
– Managing commitment 
Is there a clear timetable for meetings, publicized well in advance? Are agendas clear and focused and 
accompanied by thorough advance research, allowing meetings to proceed quickly and efficiently? Are efforts 
made to minimize demands on time so as to be reasonable to expect from busy individuals?  
 
– Flexibility 
Does the structure include the flexibility to reform itself if its initial set-up proves to be insufficiently effective? Has 
thought been given to possible ways of handling scenarios in which the partnership needs to be dissolved? 
 
4. Setting the goals – and reaching them 
 
– Mission statements 
Are general objectives clearly defined, such as improving competitiveness and building relationships?  
 
– Managing expectations 
Has the partnership avoided the risk of raising expectations too high and setting the stage for disillusionment? 
 
– Quantifiable outcomes 
Are there specific targets – for example, achieving legislative reforms, publishing “business roadblocks” and 
“business roadmaps”, holding conferences, improving a country’s position in international league tables – which 
are concrete enough for stakeholders to be able to assess the partnership’s effectiveness?  
 
– Low-hanging fruit 
Have specific reforms been set as immediate priorities which are achievable in the short term, affect the private 
sector broadly and command wide social acceptance? 
 
– Monitoring and accountability 
Are monitoring and accountability mechanisms in place to ensure that agreements in principle translate into 
action on the ground? Do these mechanisms also serve to build public confidence by increasing transparency 
and reducing the risk of subversion into rent-seeking activities? 
 
– Clarity and credibility 
Is sufficient expertise available to ensure that policy papers and reform proposals are clear, credible, thoroughly 
researched and compellingly argued? 
 
5. Role of donors 
 
– Public image 
Is the donor organization’s role commensurate with its public image – ie a cheerleader role if it is trusted and 
respected, a behind-the-scenes role if it is the object of public suspicion? 
 
– Avoiding favoritism 
Does the donor’s involvement raise any prospect of emphasizing the interests of some stakeholders above 
those of others?  
 
– Backseat driving 
To what extent is the donor willing to provide funding, logistical support and advice while leaving it up to the 
participants to decide on recommendations and reforms? Is the donor’s sponsorship primarily a means of getting 
its own agenda implemented, and does this create credibility and legitimacy problems?  
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– Transferring ownership 
Is funding committed for a sufficiently long period to establish credibility in the partnership’s sustainability? Does 




– Branding and marketing 
Has the partnership been given a strong brand identity with a name that succinctly captures its aims, and a logo 
that features prominently on all press releases, documents, photo opportunities etc?  
 
– Using the media 
Is there a policy of open and active engagement with journalists? Are public announcements of aims used as a 
way of creating pressure on the participants to live up to expectations? 
 
– Engaging the grassroots 
Have efforts been made to engage SMEs, through existing business associations and/or directly through eg 
mail-outs, field research, travelling roadshows? Is there a quick, simple and well-publicised method for 
stakeholders to submit recommendations for inclusion in the reform agenda? 
 
– Enlisting the public 
Has a website been set up to disseminate information and request feedback? Is there a marketing strategy to drum up support 
for reform among the general public, by explaining in easy-to-grasp terms the benefits of reform for ordinary people?  
 
– Targeting decision-makers  
Are there specific efforts to reach out to parliamentarians and local-level politicians whose motivations can be 
critical in the practical implementation of reforms? 
 
– Sharing experience 
Are mechanisms in place to share experience and best practice with other competitiveness partnerships, at 
subregional, regional and global levels? Page 42 of 55 
 




Ideas and examples for this paper have been taken from a wide range of resources, many of which dealt only 
tangentially with competitiveness partnerships and/or are not in the public realm. For those interested in further 




Survey of Good Practice in Public-Private Sector Dialogue – UNCTAD, 2001 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteteb4_en.pdf 
A helpful distillation of some best practice in public-private dialogue drawn from experiences in several countries, 
with emphasis on SME promotion in the developing world. Especially valuable on identifying the conditions and 
culture which are conducive to dialogue and on discussing the role of private sector representative 
organizations. 
 
Participation Revisited: A Managerial Perspective – Benjamin Crosby, USAID, April 2000 
http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACM018.pdf 
A philosophical and practical overview of the value and limitations of participation in formulating public policy. 
Discusses the costs and benefits of efforts to increase participation, identifies circumstances which are most 
propitious, and assesses some practical problems of expanding participation and strategies to deal with them. 
 
Promoting Competitiveness In Practice: An Assessment of Cluster-Based Approaches – Mitchell Group, 
for USAID, November 2003 
http://www.bdsknowledge.org/dyn/bds/docs/254/USAID-Mitchell-Clusters.pdf 
Looks at public-private dialogue from the angle of working with industry clusters rather than investment climate 
reforms which affect a country’s whole economy. Looks in depth at USAID experiences in Mexico and Mongolia 
and also draws on other country experiences to distil lessons for promoting competitiveness through clusters. 
 
Regional – Eastern Europe 
 
Social Dialogue and EMU in the Candidate Countries: Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovenia – 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2003 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/publications/files/EF0340EN.pdf 
Describes a project to use tripartite dialogue – government, trades unions, business – in five EU candidate 
countries to help them prepare for meeting the Maastricht criteria for joining the Euro. Split into five individual 
country reports which contain useful discussions of the state of public-private dialogue in each country. 
 
Social Dialogue in Central and Eastern European countries: trends, issues and challenges – Giuseppe 
Casale, International Labour Office, December 2002 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/geneva/conf/malta/dialogue.htm 
Comprehensive analysis of the changing state of public-private dialogue in sixteen countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Looks at some of the challenges faced by transition economies, especially in industrial relations 
and enterprise development, and usefully explores the scope of social dialogue to manage change. 
 
Social Dialogue in European Union Candidate Countries – European Trade Union Confederation, 
September 2001 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-117167-16&type=Analysis Page 43 of 55 
Takes stock of social dialogue in the ten Central and Eastern European EU candidate countries plus Turkey, 
Cyprus and Malta. Especially good at outlining the legal, institutional and political basis of employer and trade 
union organizations, and assessing how effective interaction between them is in preparing for EU membership. 
 
Regional – Africa 
 
Participation, Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG-DG Nexus – 
Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research, 
USAID, October 2001 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm002.pdf 
Looks at specific experiences of dialogue in Uganda, Ghana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to explore the 
relationships between dialogue, economic growth and democratization. Especially interesting on the connections 
and potential tension between growth and democratization and the role of donors in addressing that tension. 
 
Regional – Pacific 
 
Public-Private Sector Partnerships – Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, July 2002 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/docs/FEMM/2002/femv05.pdf 
Discussion paper for a meeting of economic ministers of Pacific Islands Forum countries on the subject of public-
private dialogue. Contains a good exploration of general lessons about dialogue – its aims and scope and best 
practice in implementation – together with discussions of experiences both in the Pacific region and beyond. 
 
National – Bosnia 
Investment Climate Reform: Going The Last Mile, The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina – 
Benjamin Herzberg 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/38171_wps3390.pdf  
Comprehensive exploration of the establishment of the acclaimed Bulldozer project in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Especially valuable in describing how innovative outreach and media management techniques were used to 
build bottom-up support for economic reform, change social attitudes and enthuse small and medium 
entrepreneurs. 
 
National – Botswana 
Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue: The Experience from Botswana – Dr Anthony Land 
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Navigation.nsf/index2?readform&http://www.ecdpm.org/Web
_ECDPM/Web/Content/Content.nsf/0/98e4a925ac004ee1c1256c7e003aca9c?OpenDocument 
Based in part on illuminating interviews with participants, provides a helpful general synopsis of public-private 
dialogue in Botswana, describes how the current structures for dialogue evolved and how they function, and 
contains a useful discussion of their respective strengths and weaknesses and lessons that can be learned.  
 
National – Bulgaria 
Effectiveness of Public-Private Dialogue in Bulgaria – Petya Mandova  
http://www.ime-bg.org/pdf_docs/public-private dialogue(revised).doc 
Discusses the role that public-private dialogue has played in changes in the Bulgarian business environment 
since the mid-1990s. Explores both formal and informal consultative mechanisms. Especially useful for the 
negative lessons that can be learned from instances of dialogue that have not been found effective. 
 
National – Ghana 
Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – Joseph 
Ayee, University of Ghana, Michael Lofchie, UCLA, Carolina Wieland, UCLA, October 1999 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/lofchie/ghanastudy.pdf 
Lengthy and comprehensive assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of several attempts at establishing 
public-private dialogue in Ghana during the 1990s. Especially useful for its discussion of the difficulties involved 
in setting up dialogue in an atmosphere of long-held mistrust between the public and private sectors. 
 
Also recommended but not available online 
 
Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia – World Bank Private Sector 
Development Department, Occasional Paper no 38, September 1999 Page 44 of 55 
Exploration of the “Malaysia Inc” policy of public-private consultation. Useful descriptions of the various strands 
of dialogue and assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the policy. Especially interesting for the 
personal insights provided by participants in the dialogue, collected through interviews during field research. 
 
Consultative Mechanisms in Mexico – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, Occasional 
Paper no 38, March 2000 
Tells the history of Mexico’s economic pacts in the late 1980s and the use of public-private dialogue during 
Mexico’s NAFTA negotiations. Especially interesting on the subject of institutional capture and as an exploration 
of an example of dialogue which is atypical in pursuing binding agreements to tackle an urgent problem. 
 
Public-Private Sector Consultative Mechanisms (Assessment of existing arrangements and potentials 
for a sustained public-private partnership in Nigeria) – UNIDO, April 2002 
Succinct history of public-private interaction in Nigeria and assessment of the state of play before the recent 
establishment of the Better Business Initiative. Useful discussions of lessons learned from the difficulties of 
pursuing dialogue in an atmosphere of mistrust and of the potential for dialogue to improve governance. 
 
Public-Private Partnerships for Economic Development and Competitiveness, with Special Reference to 
the African Experience – UNIDO, April 2000 
Very useful distillation of best practice and lessons learnt from assessing experiences of dialogue in eight 
African countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. Also good 
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Annex III: Partnerships summaries 
 
This annex contains brief outline descriptions of competitiveness partnerships referenced in this work. It does not 
aim to be either exhaustive in the partnerships it lists or comprehensive in the descriptions it provides. If you 
know of a competitiveness partnership we have not mentioned which offers useful guidance for future versions 
of this paper, please tell us about it by completing and returning the form at the end of this annex.  
 
Country:  Bolivia 
Initiative:  National Dialogue 
Dates:    1997 –  
Comments:  The first National Dialogue in 1997 was a government-led project intended to involve society in 
formulating a national development plan. It made some progress but was widely regarded as a disappointment 
because expectations had been raised among a wide range of stakeholders but relatively few concrete results 
were achieved. A similar response greeted the next National Dialogue in 2000, organized by the government at 
the behest of the World Bank and IMF to assist in the framing of the national poverty reduction strategy. 
More info:  www.worldbank.org/participation/web/webfiles/bolivia.htm 
    www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/0204part/bolivia.pdf 
 
Country:  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Initiative:  Bulldozer Initiative 
Dates:    2002 –   
Comments:  Sponsored by five international donors, led by the Office of the High Representative. Used 
roadshows and media outreach to involve SMEs, distributing a simple form on which entrepreneurs could submit 
reform proposals. Set the target of passing “50 economic reforms in 150 days” in its first phase. Into its third 
phase at the time of writing, with increased local ownership and representation expanded to labor groups. 
Regarded as a model for generating bottom-up support and successful use of the media. 
More info:  Investment Climate Reform – Going the Last Mile: The Bulldozer Initiative in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – Benjamin Herzberg, World Bank, September 2004;  
www.bulldozer.ba (English)  
www.buldozer.ba (with one “l” only, in Bosnian, more up to date) 
 
Country:  Botswana 
Initiative:  High Level Consultative Council 
Dates:    1996 –  
Comments:  Meets twice yearly, chaired by the president, with membership drawn from senior politicians and 
civil servants, business representatives nominated by associations, and other stakeholders invited on an ad hoc 
basis. Sector-based groups meet quarterly. Private sector sets the agenda, with government having veto power. 
Also functions as a monitoring body for agreements reached at biennial National Business Conferences. 
More info:  Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr 
Anthony Land, May 2002 
 
Country:  Botswana 
Initiative:  National Business Conference 
Dates:    1988 – 
Comments:  Biennial conference initiated by the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and 
Manpower in 1988. Initially an advocacy event but evolved into a spirit of partnership and spawned the High 
Level Consultative Council, which made public-private dialogue more frequent and structured. 
More info:  Case Study on Structured Public-Private Sector Dialogue, The Experience from Botswana – Dr 
Anthony Land, May 2002 
 
Country:  Bulgaria 
Initiative:  Coalition 2000 
Dates:    1997 –  
Comments:  Launched by non-profit organization the Center for the Study of Democracy with the support of 
USAID, aimed at improving Bulgaria’s record on corruption. Organizes an annual conference for 40-50 senior 
representatives of the public and private sector and other public personalities, at which an anti-corruption Action 
Plan is discussed and adopted. This partnership has resulted in a dramatic improvement in Bulgaria’s standing 
in the Transparency International corruption league table. Page 46 of 55 
More info:  www.anticorruption.bg/eng/coalition/about.htm 
 
Country:  Cambodia 
Initiative:  Private Sector Forum 
Dates:    2002 –  
Comments:  Seven working groups, six of which are sector-based and one issue-based, with a Coordinating 
Bureau – funded by the International Finance Corporation and AusAID – providing organizational focus and 
logistical support. Biannual meetings chaired by the Prime Minister with representatives from government, 
business and the donor community. Achieving steady progress in building trust and initiating reforms. 
More info:  Cambodia: Coordinating Bureau of the Private Sector Forum (Supported by International 
Finance Corporation, Australian Agency for International Development) Progress Report January 2002 - January  
2004 – James Brew, March 2004 
 
Country:  Cameroon  
Initiative:  Competitiveness Committee 
Dates:    1998 
Comments:  Created by presidential decree with support from the World Bank. Results were disappointing as 
the committee was effectively captured by members of one business association. 
More info:  Business-Government Consultative Mechanisms – Agata E Pawlowska, May 2001 
 
Country:  European Union 
Initiative:  Regional Innovation Strategies 
Dates:    2000 – 
Comments:  Public-private dialogue is a key part of this funding initiative which aims to help the EU’s poorer 
regions to become more competitive through greater innovation. Each regional project is different, but an 
industry  cluster approach is often adopted. 
More info:  europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/innovation/pdf/guide_ris_final.pdf 
 
Country:  Ghana 
Initiative:  Private Sector Advisory Group 
Dates:    1992-1993 
Comments:  Initiated by World Bank through personal contacts with Minister of Finance. Narrowly-based, 
with three government representatives and six from multinational corporations. Led to the repeal of some laws 
but viewed by the public as unrepresentative. Collapsed after a year when the Minister of Finance left 
government. 
More info:  Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – 
Joseph Ayee (University of Ghana), Michael Lofchie (UCLA) and Carolina Wieland (UCLA), World Bank Private 
Sector Development Department, October 1999 
 
Country:  Ghana 
Initiative:  Private Sector Roundtable 
Dates:    1993-1994 
Comments:  Initiated by the World Bank, with 50 representatives chosen by World Bank with the aim of 
broadly representing Ghanaian business, including SMEs. Met weekly with six sub-committees, no official 
mandate and no limits on topics open for discussion, leading to lack of focus. Some minor successes but faded 
away after submitting a report to government which did not generate action. 
More info:  Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – 
Joseph Ayee (University of Ghana), Michael Lofchie (UCLA) and Carolina Wieland (UCLA), World Bank Private 
Sector Development Department, October 1999 
 
Country:  Ghana 
Initiative:  Private Enterprise Foundation 
Dates:    1990s –  
Comments:  Initiated by Ghanaian business community with funding from international donors including 
UNDP and USAID. Umbrella organization bringing together private sector associations, functions as an 
advocacy and lobbying group as a broad remit. Momentum waned after early successes when it lost the 
confidence of the government, and now tends to focus more on raising short-term complaints; meets private 
sector minister every two months and the president twice a year. Page 47 of 55 
More info:  Government-Business Relations in Ghana: The Experience With Consultative Mechanisms – 
Joseph Ayee (University of Ghana), Michael Lofchie (UCLA) and Carolina Wieland (UCLA), World Bank Private 
Sector Development Department, October 1999; Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact 
Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005. 
 
 
Country:  Ghana 
Initiative:  Ghana Investors Advisory Council 
Dates:    2002 –  
Comments:  Initiated by the World Bank, with the aim of gathering 15-20 representatives drawn equally from 
multinationals in Ghana, multinationals not in Ghana, and Ghanaian businesses. Success limited at time of 
writing, attributed to lack of focus and top-level government enthusiasm. 
More info:  Investor Councils in Africa: Scoping Study Results – Melissa Bennett, World Bank, April 2001; 
Investors Councils: Status report – World Bank, April 2003; Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa 
Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005. 
 
Country:  Hungary 
Initiative:  Economic Council and Social Council 
Dates:    1998 – 
Comments:  Set up by the Hungarian government to replace previous tripartite consultation bodies. The 
Economic Council includes representatives from government, trades unions, business associations and 
multinationals and advises on economic policy. The Social Council includes representatives from NGOs. 
More info:  www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/geneva/conf/malta/dialogue.htm 
 
Country:  Indonesia 
Initiative:  Private Sector Forum – national and regional 
Dates:    2001 –  
Comments:  Funded and facilitated by the World Bank Group, the Private Sector Forum operated first at a 
national level in Indonesia (with support from the IFC) and has spread onto regional levels with support of the 
World Bank (at the time of writing: Bali, Balikpanan, Makassar, Surabaya) as political power has been 
decentralized. The aim of the Forum is to promote an open dialogue between business and government. 
More info:  Private Sector Forum PRE-CGI Mid-Year Review – Jakarta, Indonesia, IFC, June 2002; 
Regional Private Sector Forum Issues Paper – The World Bank and Municipal Government of Makassar, June 
2003 
 
Country:  Japan 
Initiative:  Deliberation Councils 
Dates:    1945 –  
Comments:  Since World War II, Japan has had “deliberation councils” organised both thematically and by 
industry sector. Consensus is encouraged, with ministries holding hearings for interested parties and research 
groups producing reports for discussion in the councils. The model has established a good deal of legitimacy, 
such that proposals with the approval of deliberation councils stand a better chance of passing into law. 
More info:  Public/Private Consultation Partnerships – Mark Dorfman and Agata E Pawlowska, World Bank 
 
Country:  Malaysia 
Initiative:  Malaysian Business Council / “Malaysia Inc.” 
Dates:    Early 1990s –  
Comments:  Policy of public-private dialogue dubbed “Malaysia Inc.” was announced in 1983 but became 
more institutionalized in the early 1990s through the Malaysian Business Council, which has 72 members drawn 
from business and government, with token labor representation. It has nine working groups, and meets once or 
twice a year behind closed doors. “Malaysia Inc” also encompasses state-level dialogue and ad hoc 
consultations by specific ministries, including large-scale annual dialogues by the Ministries of Trade and 
Finance. 
More info:  Consultative Mechanisms and Economic Governance in Malaysia – World Bank Private Sector 
Development Department, Occasional Paper no 38, September 1999 
 
Country:  Mali 
Initiative:  Council Presidential Investment Page 48 of 55 
Dates:    2004 –   
Comments:  Seen as complementary to other existing methods of local dialogue, including an annual forum 
between the private sector and president. Has 21 members and four working groups and its secretariat lodged in 
the president’s office. Has only met once at the time of writing. 
More info:  Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, 
World Bank, January 2005. 
 
Country:  Malta 
Initiative:  Malta Council for Social and Economic Development 
Dates:    2001 –  
Comments:  Tripartite forum comprising representative from government, business and labor unions, 
established by legislation – replacing a non-statutory body which had existed before – and given the objective of 
promoting dialogue and making recommendations to the government on social and economic policy. Consists of 
14 members appointed by the Prime Minister, with a separate body including three civil society representatives. 
More info:  www.mcesd.org.mt 
 
Country:  Mauritius 
Initiative:  Joint Economic Council 
Dates:    1970 –  
Comments:  Co-ordinating body for private sector liaison with government, bringing together nine business 
associations, which fully fund and each contribute two representatives to the 18-member council. Meetings with 
the government are held semi-annually and chaired by the prime minister, alongside other subject-specific 
dialogue mechanisms with relevant ministries on issues such as the budget and WTO.   
More info:   www.jec-mauritius.org 
 
Country:  Mexico 
Initiative:  Economic Pacts 
Dates:    Late 1980s 
Comments:  The “pacts” were agreements between representatives of government, business and labor 
aimed at providing urgent solutions to a spiraling economic crisis. The government set the agenda and invited 
participants to Friday night talks which would continue into the weekend until an agreement had been reached. A 
high-level follow-up commission met weekly to track progress and monitor compliance. The pacts had some 
success in fostering trust between the actors and bringing hyperinflation under control. 
More info:  Consultative Mechanisms in Mexico – World Bank Private Sector Development Department, 
Occasional Paper no 38, March 2000 
 
Country:  Nigeria 
Initiative:  National Council on Industrial Development 
Dates:    Late 1980s 
Comments:  Established by the government, with representation from private sector associations. Lack of 
success attributed to lack of focus and commitment from public sector. 
More info:  Public-Private Sector Consultative Mechanisms: Assessments of existing arrangements and 
potentials for a sustained public-private partnership in Nigeria – UNIDO, April 2002 
 
Country:  Nigeria 
Initiative:  Better Business Initiative, formerly Competitiveness Forum Working Group 
Dates:    2002 –  
Comments:  Bottom-up approach aimed at strengthening change agents and promoting independent policy 
analysis and advocacy. Donor-funded secretariat together with five working groups each hosted by local 
institutions and charged with producing one “Business Roadmap” – an overview of the working group’s policy 
area (which are SME development, infrastructure, agriculture, legal/regulatory reforms and monetary policy) – 
and five “Business Roadblocks”, specific proposals for reform. 
More info:  www.bbi-nigeria.org 
 
Country:  Nigeria 
Initiative:  Abia and Anambra State Implementation Committees 
Dates:    2002 –  Page 49 of 55 
Comments:  Relatively unstructured dialogue between state-level governments and local businesses based 
on a cluster approach. Working groups but no permanent secretariat. Dialogue is facilitated by donors through a 
local contractor and behind-the-scenes influence. The partnership is moving towards greater structure at the 
time of writing as local champions seek to increase the coordination of committee activities. 
More info:  Mary Agboli, World Bank. 
 
Country:  Nigeria 
Initiative:  National Economic Summit Group 
Dates:    1990s –  
Comments:  Private sector advocacy group that aims to influence economic policy. Works through a 
permanent secretariat and working groups and holds an annual summit. Strong element of local ownership as 
the secretariat’s funding comes from fees paid by private sector members; donors contribute funding towards 
specific events such as the summits. 
More info:  Mary Agboli, World Bank 
 
Country:  Senegal 
Initiative:  Growth and Competitiveness Review Group 
Dates:    1993 –  
Comments:  Created by presidential decree with support from the World Bank. The aim was to address 
constraints on private sector development, and representation was drawn from government, business 
organisations, labor, academia and media. There were five commissions, organised by theme. Gradually built 
credibility and became regarded as a success in creating the right conditions for reforms to take place. Later had 
its functions merged into a bigger organisation, the Investment Promotions and Major Projects Agency. 
More info:  Business-Government Consultative Mechanisms – Agata E Pawlowska, May 2001 
 
Country:  Senegal 
Initiative:  Presidential Investors Council 
Dates:    2002 –  
Comments:  Initiated by the World Bank to bring private sector voices face-to-face with government decision-
makers. Intended to be divided in equal thirds between local firms, multinationals represented in the country, and 
multinationals not represented in the country, with a target membership of around 20. Split into four working 
groups along issue lines, and built on pre-existing consensus to deliver specific policy reform proposals which 
delivered quick wins and built credibility and momentum. 
More info:  Investors Councils: Status report as of April 2003 – World Bank, April 2003 
 
Country:  South Africa 
Initiative:  National Economic Development and Labour Council 
Dates:    1995 –  
Comments:  Set up by statute and located within the Ministry of Labor, with the aim of fostering growth, 
equity and social consensus. Brings together government, business, trades unions and representatives of other 
social groups. Four chambers and various working teams research and make recommendations, which are 
discussed at an annual summit of around 300 people. A management committee and secretariat control focus 
and logistics. 
More info:  www.nedlac.org.za 
 
Country:  Suriname 
Initiative:  Suriname Business Forum 
Dates:    2003 –  
Comments:  Set up with the help of the EC, the Surname Business forum first did not fulfill its role of 
institutional linkage between the government and the private sector. An ad-hoc initiative created in 2005 to 
amend the Law on Investment seems to have revived it, as three business associations (KKF, ASFA and VSB)  
have now created  a dialogue process with the Ministry of Finance, which they wish to carry on through the 
Forum.  
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Country:  Tanzania 
Initiative:  Tanzania Investors Round Table 
Dates:    2002 –   
Comments:  Initiated by the World Bank to bring private sector voices face-to-face with government decision-
makers. Intended to be divided in equal thirds between local firms, multinationals represented in the country, and 
multinationals not represented in the country, with around 30 members. Designed to fit in alongside existing 
business advocacy groups. Initially concentrated on five action areas. 
More info:  Investors Councils: Status report as of April 2003 – World Bank, April 2003; Presidential Investor 
Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005. 
 
Country:  Tanzania 
Initiative:  Tanzania National Business Council 
Dates:    2001 –   
Comments:  Meetings with 25 members selected by private sector associations, chaired by the president, 
have happened only twice since the launch in September 2001. Has not had significant impact due to problems 
with preparation and composition. 
More info:  Investors Councils: Status report as of April 2003 – World Bank, April 2003; Presidential Investor 
Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, World Bank, June 2005. 
 
Country:  Turkey 
Initiative:  Coordination Council for Improvement of the Investment Climate 
Dates:    2001 –  
Comments:  Set up by the Turkish government following a report by the World Bank which channeled 
feedback from international investors. Chaired by the economics minister and also has representatives from four 
other ministries and four major business associations. There are ten technical committees, the heads of which 
meet monthly. Has been instrumental in passing many reforms.  
More info:  cciie@hazine.gov.tr 
 
Country:  Uganda 
Initiative:  National Forum 
Dates:    Early 1994 – 1997 
Comments:  Funded by USAID. Annual three-day conference, permanent secretariat and working groups 
that meet monthly to monitor progress from last annual conference and plan proposals for next one. 
Representatives chosen by a committee that seeks to identify a dynamic mix of individuals, leading to a relatively 
informal atmosphere. Some concrete achievements but effectiveness waned due to frustration at slow pace of 
progress. 
More info:  Institutional Strategy for the Uganda National Forum – USAID, September 1997; Participation, 
Consultation and Economic Reform in Africa: Economic Fora and the EG/DG Nexus – USAID, October 2001 
 
Country:  Uganda 
Initiative:  Presidential Investors Advisory Council 
Dates:    2004 –   
Comments:  Has 28 members, four working groups and its secretariat lodged in the investment promotion 
agency. Has met only once at the time of writing. 
More info:  Presidential Investor Advisory Councils in Africa Impact Assessment Study – Natwar Gotecha, 
World Bank, June 2005. 
 
Country:  Vietnam 
Initiative:  Vietnam Business Forum 
Dates:    1998 – 
Comments:  Semi-annual meetings between government, business and international donor community, 
organised by the IFC, which funds and supports the secretariat. There are two working groups – one of which, 
Manufacturing & Distribution, is further split into eight working teams – which meet more frequently with 
government counterparts. Objectives are defined in a charter, and participation is open to all on a voluntary 
basis. Widely regarded as successful in bringing more trust and understanding between the public and private 
sectors. 
More info:  www.vietnambusinessforum.org Page 51 of 55 









Questionnaire to practitioners 
 
Context: The World  Bank Private Sector Development unit is currently researching lessons learned from 
competitiveness partnerships – structured dialogue between government representatives and business groups 
on investment climate reforms. We are trying to gather evidence of what such partnerships can achieve, what 
can go wrong, and strategies for success. While distilling best practice is difficult because what works in one 
country may not work in another, we are trying to bring together ideas that governments and stakeholders can 
draw on to initiate or improve dialogue. 
 
In that context, we would be most grateful if you could take a moment to look at the fifteen questions below and 
contribute your insights.  
 
Objectives: We are looking for two things:  
•  we want to make sure our experience is current, because many of the published sources on country-
specific dialogue experiences are several years out of date;  
•  we want to gather examples, anecdotes and informed opinions.  
 
We would appreciate if you could be as specific and concrete in your responses as possible. When you have 
experience of more than one country, please let us know in each response which one you are referring to.  
 
Please feel under no obligation to respond to every question – although if you do have the time to do so, that 
would certainly be appreciated. These questions are intended as sparks; if you find you have something to say 
on one point but not on any others, we would much rather have only one question answered than no response at 
all. Similarly, when we ask about problems and possible solutions, please describe your experience of the 
problem even if you are not aware of any solution. 
 
Many thanks in advance for your time, 
 




•  Your name, organization and contact information: 
 
•  What is/are the competitiveness partnership(s) you know about or have been involved with? 
Name, country, year(s) 
 
•  Do you agree to be cited as reference in our report? 
 
Intent and Results 
 
•  What were the objectives of the partnership? Was the objective to have a specific impact on policy 
reform (eg on the regulatory burden) or more general (e.g. to foster dialogue between the 
constituents)? 
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•  How were results measured? Were there specific evaluation criteria and/or monitoring mechanisms? 
Did the presence or lack of these criteria and mechanisms contribute to the project’s perceived 
success? 
 
•  What positive results have you experienced? We’re looking for specific examples of reforms directly 
attributable to public-private dialogue, and also for anecdotal evidence which indicates a shift in 





•  Was the dialogue fair to SMEs? Sometimes governments dialogue mostly with big corporations, and 
home-grown SMEs feel left out. Has this been an issue in your experience? Has anything been 
done about it – eg direct outreach to entrepreneurs or work to strengthen organizations representing 
SMEs? 
 
•  Did participants adequately represent society? Were academics, NGOs, labor unions, consumer or 
environmental groups included in the dialogue, and to what effect? What can be done to strike a 
happy balance between consultation that’s too broad to be efficient and too narrow to be legitimate?  
 
•  What was the role of donors? High-profile donor involvement can raise suspicions among 
stakeholders about hidden agendas, but without donor impetus the public and private sectors may 




•  How was the partnership structured? Was there a permanent secretariat to organize meetings and 
set the agenda, or was dialogue more unstructured and ad hoc? If there was a secretariat, was it 
funded by donors or by participants such as business groups? How did the structure impact on 
effectiveness? 
 
•  Were issues tackled through specific working groups? Working groups may be organized around 
topical issues, industry clusters or sometime organized on the basis of geographical location. Do 
you have experience of the advantages and disadvantages of any of these approaches? 
 
Communication and outreach 
 
•  Was there a communication strategy? Was the partnership supported from the bottom up? Did the 
dialogue meet with popular support or mistrust? Has there been any media/PR strategy for reaching 
out to the public and creating a constituency for reform? If so, what did it consist of and has it been 
successful? 
 
Safeguards and Sustainability 
 
•  What safeguards were used? Contacts between government and business leaders can create 
opportunities for rent-seeking as well as for reform. Has dialogue reinforced the power of existing 
elites? Have ways been found to prevent this? 
 
•  Were individuals or institutions more important? Has dialogue rested on the personal involvement of 
key individuals, so that the process loses steam if those individuals lose enthusiasm or influence? 
Has it been possible to find ways to institutionalize dialogue so that it persists when individuals move 
on? 
 
•  How was momentum sustained? When initial objectives have been achieved, or when objectives are 
open-ended, consultation can become an ineffective talking shop. Has this happened? Have 
any ways been found to maintain the enthusiasm of participants given the natural difficulty 
in getting results?  Page 53 of 55 
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